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SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT JEWISH LAW IN 
ISRAEL’S SUPREME COURT 
STEVEN F. FRIEDELL

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers whether the Israeli Supreme Court‟s effort to 
incorporate the parts of Jewish law that deal with secular subjects is 
internally flawed. The use of Jewish law differs from the use of the law of 
other jurisdictions. Typically courts rely on other jurisdictions‟ precedents 
to show that a rule is practical, that the court is not overstepping its 
authority, and that adoption of the rule will lead to interstate or 
international uniformity. The use of Jewish law does not satisfy these 
goals. There is concern that the religious elements of Jewish law are 
pervasive and that much of Jewish law is not well suited for a modern 
society. This Article considers the approach of looking to Jewish law, not 
for specific rules that will be applied, but as a storehouse from which one 
can seek enlightenment. Even under this approach, this Article finds that 
some Israeli Supreme Court cases have misapplied Jewish law either by 
taking Jewish law out of context or by reading modern legal concepts into 
Jewish law. This Article suggests ways that some of these cases could have 
better employed Jewish law and also describes cases that have properly 
done so. It concludes that, when used properly, Jewish law can help to link 
Israeli law to a rich cultural heritage. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century—and for a variety of motives—some have sought 
to find a way to integrate parts of Jewish law into the law of what has 
become the State of Israel.
1
 The proponents of this effort have coined the 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. My thanks to Ari Afilalo, Perry Dane, 
Richard Freeman, and Yuval Sinai for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. See 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW 1588 (1994) [hereinafter ELON TREATISE]. For a study 
of different strands within the movement, see Assaf Likhovski, The Invention of “Hebrew Law” in 
Mandatory Palestine, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 339 (1998); Amihai Radzyner, Ha-mishpat ha-„ivri eino 
Halakhah (u-vekhol zot yesh bo „Erekh), [Mishpat „Ivri Is Not Halakhah (But It Still Has Value)], 16 
AKDAMOT 139, 141–43 (2005). For rabbinic objections to Mishpat „Ivri, see Amihai Radzyner, 
Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy Over the Research of Jewish Law Using Comparative 
Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L. & RELIG. 189 (2007). See generally YUVAL SINAI, 
YISUM HA-MISHPAT HA-ÌVRI BE-VATEI HA-MISHPAT BE-YISRAEL [APPLICATION OF JEWISH LAW IN 
THE ISRAELI COURTS] (2009). 
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term ―Mishpat ‗Ivri‖ (literally, ―Hebrew law,‖ but often mis-translated as 
―Jewish law‖) to refer to those parts of Jewish law that deal with matters 
typically treated by Western legal systems.
2
 The effort has helped spawn a 
tremendous body of scholarship determined to apply modern methods of 
research and analysis to a vast body of legal literature.
3 
There has been a 
phenomenal growth in the understanding of the linguistic, textual, 
historical, and doctrinal aspects of over two millennia of Jewish law. If for 
nothing else, the Mishpat ‗Ivri movement deserves credit for contributing 
to this phenomenon.  
Some Israeli Supreme Court judges use Jewish law even when Israeli 
law requires the courts to fill lacunas in the law by referring to English 
common law.
4
 This practice gained support when the Knesset adopted the 
1980 Foundations of Law Act, which provides in part: ―Where the court, 
faced with a legal question requiring decision, finds no answer to it in 
statute law or case-law or by analogy, it shall decide it in light of the 
principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel‘s heritage.‖5 In 
1992 the Knesset passed a basic law on human dignity and freedom that 
seeks ―to establish . . . the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state.‖6 This, too, has been used as a basis for the use of Jewish 
law.
7
 
 
 
 2. This Article will use the term ―Jewish law‖ to refer to the Halakhah, the entire body of 
rabbinic law.  
 3. See NAHUM RAKOVER, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JEWISH LAW (1975); NAHUM RAKOVER, THE 
MULTI-LANGUAGE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JEWISH LAW (1990).  
 4. See MOSHE SILBERG, TALMUDIC LAW AND THE MODERN STATE 150 n.45 (1973) (examples 
of cases).  
 5. Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1979–80) (Isr.). Israeli judges disagree over 
how this statute affects the use of Jewish law. Compare 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1835–38 
(A court should use Jewish law when a statute is ambiguous, when general terms such as ―negligence‖ 
are involved, or when legislation does not define a term.), with AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION 89 (1989) (A court is to look to the principles of Israel‘s heritage listed in the statute only 
if it can find no other answer in statutes, case-law, or by analogy.), and HCJ 1635/90 Jerczewski v. 
Prime Minister [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 749, 859 (Barak, J.) (holding that the Foundations of Law Act is 
intended to apply to lacuna in legislation and not to the development of the law), translated in ELON 
CASEBOOK, infra note 45, at 422, 432–33. See Leon Sheleff, When a Minority Becomes a Majority—
Jewish Law and Tradition in the State of Israel, 13 TEL AVIV U. STUD. IN L. 115 (1997). For a middle 
position, see Arye Edrei, Madu‟a Lanu Mishpat „Ivri [Why Teach Jewish Law], 25 ‗IYUNEI MISHPAT 
[TEL AVIV U. L. REV.] 467, 480–81 (2001) (obligation to look to Jewish law is for comparative 
purposes, but not for binding precedent or for investigating the extent to which one should adopt the 
advice of Jewish law); Hanina Ben Menachem,  Chok Yesodot Ha-mishpat ha-„ivri-Chovat Tsuit „o 
Chovat Hiva‟atsut [The Foundations of Law Act—How Much of a Duty?], 13 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT 
HA-IVRI 257 (1988) (stating there is a duty to consult Jewish heritage). 
 6. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391, available at http://www.knesset. 
gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
 7. E.g., CA 506/88 Shefer v. Israel  [1993] IsrSC 48(1) 87, translated in [1992–1994] IsrLR 
170, and in ELON CASEBOOK, infra note 45, at 592, 638. 
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Israeli courts apply Jewish law in different contexts, and some of these 
applications have created tension within Israel‘s largely secular society. 
This Article will not discuss issues of marriage and divorce, for which 
Israeli Jews are governed by Jewish law.
8
 Nor will it address the tension 
that arises when the Israeli Supreme Court determines whether a rabbinic 
court or religious body has complied with a statutory mandate.
9
 Rather, 
this Article will focus on the Supreme Court‘s use of Jewish law as an aid 
for filling gaps in the law in areas such as torts, contracts, and criminal 
law.  
This Article will not address the difficulties facing the Mishpat ‗Ivri 
movement of enabling a largely secular bar, unfamiliar with the sources 
and methodologies of Jewish law, to use that law effectively.
10
 Rather, this 
Article will examine whether the project is internally flawed. That is, even 
if Israel‘s bench and bar desired to comply with the movement‘s aims, 
could its goals be attained? This Article will describe some of the 
difficulties inherent in the goal of incorporating Jewish law; it will focus 
on a few Israeli Supreme Court cases that illustrate some of the stumbling 
blocks to incorporation or that show how the effort has succeeded. When 
used properly, Mishpat ‗Ivri serves to ground decisions in a rich legal 
heritage. 
In part, the problem posed by Mishpat ‗Ivri is that of any legal 
transplant: the way a rule operates depends on how it meshes with other 
substantive and procedural rules; borrowing a rule from another source can 
have unintended consequences. This can happen even when the borrowing 
occurs within a given legal system
11
 and all the more when the borrowing 
 
 
 8. See 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1757. This Article will not address the use of Jewish 
law by the Knesset in forming legislation. For a discussion of that issue, see id. at 1624–1729; 
Brahyahu Lifshitz, Israeli Law and Jewish Law—Interaction and Independence, 24 ISR. L. REV. 507 
(1990). 
 9. See, e.g., HCJ 1912/97 Rish v. Supreme Rabbinical Council [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 650 (holding 
that the Supreme Rabbinical Court can require advocates appearing before it to wear a head covering); 
HCJ 465/89 Raskin v. Religious Council [1990] IsrSC 44(2) 673 (holding that the rabbinical council 
lacks authority under statute to determine whether a restaurant is not kosher because it allows a belly 
dancer to perform; statute requires council to consider only whether the food as prepared and served is 
kosher). See Itim Haim Shapiro, Those Appearing Before Rabbinical Courts Must Cover Heads, 
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 22, 1998, at 5; Belly Dancer‟s Appeal Sways Israeli Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 1990, at A3.  
 10. See 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1925–27 (addressing some of the objections to 
Mishpat ‗Ivri); Elyahkim Rubinstein, Preface of NAHUM RAKOVER, LE-SHILUVO SHEL HA-MISHPAT 
HA-‗IVRI BA-MISHPAT HA-YISRE‘ELI [JEWISH LAW AND ISRAELI LAW—ON THE PROCESS OF 
INTEGRATION] 11–13 (1998) (on the importance of knowing Jewish law).  
 11. For example, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006), governing rights of a seaman injured 
by an employer‘s negligence, incorporates the Federal Employers‘ Liability Act (―FELA‖), 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 51–59 (1908), which governs the rights of railway workers. Although the FELA is the railway 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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is between different legal systems. The problem is compounded by 
Mishpat ‗Ivri‘s incorporation of only certain aspects of Jewish law—those 
that deal with matters typically handled by a secular state such as 
contracts, torts, property, and criminal law. Although the object is 
understandable, the boundaries between the secular and the religious are 
not always clear within Jewish law.
12
  
The multiple systems of law that are embodied in Jewish law itself add 
another level of complication.
13
 In addition to the rabbinic law that seeks 
to understand and elaborate upon the law that is based on the Torah 
(―Formal Law‖), rules are created by multiple institutions: rabbinic courts 
have the power to enact emergency rules,
14
 local Jewish communities can 
institute and enforce their own regulations,
15
 and, as recognized by Jewish 
commentators, the Jewish king (and by extension any Jewish governing 
body) had the power to apply his own system of law.
16
 Because non-
Jewish medieval authorities granted Jewish communities a large measure 
of autonomy, Jewish communities developed a variety of changes based 
on local custom,
17
 and in some circumstances, Jewish courts also enforced 
the law of the non-Jewish government.
18
 Another difficulty is that many 
Jewish communities lost their autonomy with the rise of the Emancipation 
at the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, there are often conflicting 
authorities within the formal legal system of Jewish law. Because there is 
no supreme authority to resolve these conflicts, there is a greater degree of 
 
 
worker‘s sole claim against the employer for injuries, the seaman can also recover against the 
employer and the vessel for unseaworthiness, maintenance, and cure. Moreover, although the FELA 
and Jones Act allow for jury trials in federal court, the seaman has the option of precluding the 
defendant from demanding a jury trial by designating his claims as maritime claims under FED. R. CIV. 
P. 9(h). These differences give the seaman advantages not possessed by the railway worker. See Atl. 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2575 n.12 (2009) (holding that a seaman can recover 
punitive damages for the willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure even though such 
damages might not be available under the Jones Act and the FELA). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See generally Arnold N. Enker, Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King‟s 
Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1137 (1991). 
 14. B. Yevamot 90b. Throughout this Article, I will use the convention of indicating a tractate of 
the Babylonian Talmud by prefacing the tractate with ―B.‖ Tractates in the Jerusalem Talmud will be 
indicated by prefacing the tractate with ―J.‖ 
 15. B. Bava Batra 8b. 
 16. RABBEUNU NISSIM GERONDI (1320–1380), DERASHOT 11, translated in MICHAEL WALZER 
ET AL., 2 JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION 156, 158 (2000) [hereinafter DERASHOT 11]. See also B. Bava 
Kamma 96b (imposing liability on a notorious thief even though he would have been exempt under the 
law); RESPONSA RASHBA (1235–1310) 3:393 (necessary for society to apply non-Torah law in matters 
of personal injury). 
 17. See 2 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 896–97. 
 18. The rabbis recognized the principle that ―the law of the kingdom is the law.‖ E.g., B. Gitin 
9b. See generally 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 64–74. 
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uncertainty about how they ought to be resolved than what might be 
expected in other legal systems. This has forced proponents of Mishpat 
‗Ivri to maintain that judges should reject those aspects of Jewish law that 
are impractical or unsuited for a modern Israeli society.
19
 
Consequently, if Mishpat ‗Ivri is to work at all, judges and legislators 
must choose from a vast array of Jewish sources. The often-unidentified 
criteria for choosing which rules to adopt may be ones that seek to 
promote morality, desired social policy, administrative efficiency, or other 
notions of justice. Since the object of Mishpat ‗Ivri is unprecedented in 
Jewish history, whatever criteria are used must arise from outside the 
Jewish legal system. Therefore, if Israel‘s courts adopt aspects of Jewish 
law, the result will be a hybrid of Jewish legal rules, external legal rules, 
and external values.  
In what way does a secular court‘s citation of Jewish law differ from a 
court‘s use of another jurisdiction‘s precedents? Although all courts that 
cite decisions from other jurisdictions make selective use of precedent, 
their purposes may differ from those of secular courts that cite Jewish law. 
A court has at least three possible reasons for citing decisions of another 
jurisdiction. One is to show that the rule is likely to be functional since at 
least one other jurisdiction has adopted it. Second, the court looks less 
arbitrary. Whenever a court makes law, there is always concern that it 
might be abusing its role by acting more like a legislative body. Citation of 
another jurisdiction‘s precedent helps to show that the rule it is 
announcing is a product of reason, not merely the court‘s whim. Third, the 
court provides assurance that there will be some degree of uniformity 
among jurisdictions that will aid interstate or international commerce.  
Citation of Jewish law, however, may not provide the same advantages. 
Because the rules of Jewish law may have developed under very different 
 
 
 19. 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1929 (accepting Jewish law solutions ―when the judge 
concludes that it accords with the needs of the time‖); id. at 1939 (incorporating principles of Jewish 
law when they are suitable for use); Likhovski, supra note 1, at 354 (clarifying that proponents of 
Mishpat ‗Ivri sought to use the principles or spirit of Jewish law but not its ―dead letters‖); Radzyner, 
Between Scholar and Jurist, supra note 1, at 219–20 (view of Asher Gulak calling for an adapted and 
refined system while preserving the underlying principles); Silberg, supra note 4, at 148–49 (stating 
that the new code ―will accept, wherever possible, the basic principles of Jewish law‖ but will 
―winnow and sift,‖ ―pour out the wine that has become sour,‖ and ―fill it with new wine.‖ ―This is 
undoubtedly a question of taste, of an historic sense and a sense of reality.‖). As Judge Drori expressed 
it, the Israeli court looks to the principles of Jewish law but not necessarily the rules with all of their 
details. CC (Jer) 2220/00 Mifalei Te‘urah v. Israel Postal Auth. [2003] IsrDC Tak-Makh 2003(2) 
16,627, ¶ 104 (discussed infra note 148). Cf. CA 89/51 Mitova Ltd. v. Kazam [1952] IsrSC 6(1) 4, 11–
12 (S. Cheshin, J.) (Although the legislature borrows terms from Jewish law it may intend for them to 
have a meaning supplied by other sources.), translated in 1 NAHUM RAKOVER, MODERN 
APPLICATIONS OF JEWISH LAW 38, 41. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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economic, social, and political circumstances, they may not all be 
functional in today‘s world. Also, because Jewish law often presents a 
judge with a vast range of conflicting decisions from which to choose, the 
citation of Jewish law may do little to reduce the appearance that the court 
is imposing its will rather than engaging in reasoned decision-making. 
Further, deciding in accordance with Jewish law does not necessarily 
provide uniformity with other jurisdictions.  
The proponents of Mishpat ‗Ivri have tried to deal with some of these 
problems. They have recognized that Mishpat ‗Ivri must sift though the 
corpus of Jewish law and discard archaic elements and select only those 
rules that fit the needs of a modern society.
20
 In some instances, the long 
and complex development of Jewish law may signal that a rule of Jewish 
law was well thought out and tested.
21
 Also, although reliance on Jewish 
law will not necessarily result in international uniformity, it can bolster a 
sense of pride, a sense of continuity, and may aid in uniting segments of 
Israeli society that hail from different lands and cultures.
22
  
Part II of this Article will examine some of the challenges of 
incorporating non-religious aspects of Jewish law into a modern legal 
system. These include the difficulty of separating secular and religious 
components and some of the ways in which the rules of Jewish law are 
impractical. Part III will focus on problems that have arisen when the 
Israeli Supreme Court has taken Jewish law out of context and when it has 
improperly read modern doctrines into Jewish law. Part IV will provide 
examples of Israeli cases that have made good use of Jewish law. 
II. CAN A RELIGIOUS LEGAL SYSTEM BE MADE SECULAR AND 
PRACTICAL? 
The terms ―secular‖ and ―religious‖ have no obvious counterpart in 
rabbinic Hebrew. Rabbinic law distinguishes between commandments that 
relate to matters between man and God and those that relate to relations 
between people, but it is understood that all harms done to another person 
 
 
 20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 21. Avraham Tennenbaum, Al Ma„amado Ha-ra‟ ui shel ha-Mishpat ha-„Ivri [The Proper Status 
of Mishpat „Ivri], 3 SHA‗AREI MISHPAT 393, 409–10 (2002). Judge Tennenbaum gives as an example 
the Jewish law rule that one may not kill another to save his own life. Although one might disagree 
with the particular example on the grounds that the rule is a moral or religious teaching and not a rule 
of criminal law, he correctly demonstrates that some Jewish law rules demand careful consideration. 
Judge Tennenbaum acknowledges that some long-standing rules of Jewish law, such as the prohibition 
of homosexual acts, are not appropriate to modern circumstances. Id. at 412. 
 22. See 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1939. 
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are also harms against God.
23
 The Talmudic topics span a range from 
matters that seem obviously religious, to matters that look to be only 
secular. Sabbath observance, sacrifices, dietary laws, and ritual purity all 
appear to be religious in nature. Torts, contracts, property law and the like 
look highly secular. However, matters are not so clear-cut. Religious 
subjects must be studied alongside civil subjects because the Talmud 
interweaves the two. For example, part of the Talmudic discussion of the 
construction of a booth used on the holiday of Sukkot turns on a complex 
discussion of laws of more general application, such as whether people 
can make legally binding decisions about situations that will arise in the 
future.
24
 Similarly, the Talmud derives the agent‘s power to act on behalf 
of the principal in part from the laws governing sacrifices and heave 
offerings (Terumah).
25
  
Religious considerations are also woven into matters that would 
otherwise be considered secular. For example, in many instances the 
Talmud concludes that a person has no liability under the laws of man but 
is liable under the laws of God.
26
 A rabbinic court could advise a person to 
atone by paying compensation, by going into exile, or by other acts of self-
denial even if not otherwise obligated to do so.
27
 A tortfeasor must not 
only compensate the victim, but must also seek the victim‘s forgiveness.28 
Yet, at times, the goal of atonement overrides other objectives. For 
example, rabbis enacted that if a thief sincerely offers to pay for stolen 
property that no longer exists, the owner shall decline the offer so that 
other thieves will not be discouraged from repenting.
29
  
The religious character of the law permeates its procedures and rules. 
For example, in Talmudic times attorneys could not represent parties to a 
 
 
 23. See 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 24. B. Sukkah 23b–24a. 
 25. B. Kiddushin 41a-b. 
 26. For example, placing poisonous food before another‘s animal thereby injuring the animal, 
giving fire to a minor or other incompetent who then burns another‘s property, or frightening another 
person. B. Bava Kamma 56a. See generally 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1724–26. 
 27. E.g., RABBI SOLOMON BEN ABRAHAM HA-KOHEN (c. 1520-c. 1601), RESPONSA 
MAHARSHAKH 4:31 (a second generation converso who informed the Venetian Inquisition about the 
mohel who circumcised him, thereby causing him indirect harm, ought to compensate the mohel for his 
losses as part of the converso‘s need for atonement); RABBI MEIR BEN GEDALIAH (1558–1616), 
RESPONSA MAHARAM OF LUBLIN 43–44 (prescribing methods of atonement for those who occasioned 
another‘s death); SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh Deah 336:1 (exile for physician who killed a patient by 
mistake).  
 28. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 422:1. See generally 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 
1, at 145–60. 
 29. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Robbery and Lost Property 1:13. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suit, partly because the judges desired to hear the truth from each party.
30
 
They believed that two individuals standing face to face before a religious 
tribunal would be less inclined to plead falsely and more inclined to 
compromise.
31
 Attorneys, however, might be unaware of all the 
relationships between the parties and would be more likely to assert the 
full array of rights available to their clients, delaying resolution of the suit. 
In the Talmud, Rav applied the phrase from Ezekiel 18:18, ―and acted 
wickedly against his kin,‖ to a person who appears as an attorney.32 
Similarly, rabbinic courts took seriously the religious implications of an 
oath and were reluctant to impose them on parties. A court could impose a 
compromise judgment to avoid forcing a party to take an oath.
33
 In yet 
another example, Jewish law provides that if a healthy person sent an 
agent to deliver a sum of money to another, the agent was to deliver it 
even if the sender died. The rabbis declared it a mitzvah (commandment) 
to fulfill the dead man‘s wishes.34 
The rabbis reinforced the religious nature of criminal proceedings by 
requiring that two witnesses warn a defendant immediately prior to the 
commission of an offense that he is about to commit an offense punishable 
by death or lashes as the case may be, and the defendant must respond that 
he not only understands the warning, but that he intends to perform the act 
anyway.
35
 As Professor Enker has shown, a person committing a crime 
under these circumstances is rebelling openly against God.
36
  
Moreover, the entire purpose of Jewish law has a mystical aspect. As 
the Torah instructed, one purpose of the law was to make the Israelites a 
―kingdom of priests and a holy nation.‖37 The Talmud teaches that a 
rabbinic judge, by applying law correctly, has the capacity to become as if 
he were a partner with God in Creation.
38
 The law is seen as the will of 
God, and its application and development are part of a continuing 
revelation of God‘s will.39 Not only is the law always in the process of 
 
 
 30. See generally Dov I. Frimer, The Role of the Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J.L. & RELIG. 297 
(1983). 
 31. Rashi, B. Shevuot 31a, at ―Zeh ha-ba be-harsha‘ah.‖  
 32. B. Shevuot 31a. The Tosafot created an exception for clients unable to adequately represent 
themselves, saying that in such an instance, the attorney is performing a mitzvah, such as fulfilling the 
commandment to restore lost property. Tosafot, B. Shevuot 31a, at ―Zeh ha-ba be-harsha‘ah.‖ 
 33. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 12:2. 
 34. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Original Acquisition and Gifts 4:5; B. Gitin 15a. 
 35. B. Sanhedrin 40b; CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties 
Within Their Jurisdiction 12:1 to :2, 16:4. See Enker, supra note 13, at 1137–38. 
 36. Enker, supra note 13, at 1144. 
 37. Exodus 19:6. 
 38. B. Shabbat 10a. 
 39. See, e.g., NUMBERS RABBAH 19:6 (―Matters not revealed to Moses were revealed to Rabbi 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/4
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formation,
40
 but the participants in that process are engaged in continual 
revelation. The Talmud teaches that a judge can either cause the Divine 
Presence to dwell among the Jews or to depart from them depending on 
whether he applies the law correctly.
41
 As Rabbenu Nissim expressed it in 
the fourteenth century, the principal purpose of the Torah law is to bring 
the Jewish people into an intimate relationship with God,
 
whereas the 
king‘s law and the law of the various peoples are only intended to preserve 
social order.
42
 
Mishpat ‗Ivri assumes that one can strip away the religious elements of 
Jewish law and leave the rules necessary for conducting a civil state.
43
 
How can that be done? What is left of law that imposes liability only in a 
court of Heaven or that seeks a wrongdoer‘s atonement in place of 
liability, if one strips away the religious element? A secular court could 
either create a rule of full liability
44
 or none at all, or advise the defendants 
of their moral obligation,
45
 but its rule will not embody the spirit of the 
original. A secular court lacks the authority of a religious court advising 
on divine judgment. Moreover, a Heavenly ―obligation‖ is not the same as 
a moral obligation because it includes the idea that God will know whether 
 
 
Akiva and his colleagues.‖); J. Sanhedrin 4:2 (God would not reveal to Moses the meaning of a rule in 
each case but would only reveal all the arguments pro and con that a human court might devise 
together with the principle that whatever a majority of a court would decide would be the law.). 
 40. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (1921) (―Nothing is 
stable. Nothing is absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an endless ‗becoming.‘‖). 
 41. B. Sanhedrin 7a. 
 42. DERASHOT 11, supra note 16, at 157. See also MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
3:27 (The Torah aims at establishing good relations among men so that man can achieve the superior 
perfection of becoming an intelligent being.); Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Petichot le-Mesekhtot Bava 
Kamma ve-Sanhedrin [Introduction to Tractates Bava Kamma and Sanhedrin], 7 TECHUMIN 273, 275 
(1986) (The Torah combines a lower level of knowledge that promotes social order with a higher level 
of knowledge that leads to spiritual elevation and insight.). 
 43. Another criticism voiced against receiving part of Jewish law into the law of the state is that 
it would injure the integrity of Jewish law. Izhak Englard, The Problem of Jewish Law in a Jewish 
State, 3 ISR. L. REV. 254 (1968). For Justice Elon‘s response, see 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 
1906–14. Justice Englard seems to have acceded to Justice Elon‘s view. See infra text at note 194. 
Another concern is that Mishpat ‗Ivri will lead to a theocracy. For discussion of this see 4 ELON 
TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1930–31; Menachem Elon, „Od le-„Inyan Chok Yesodot ha-Mishpat [More 
about the Foundations of Law Act], 13 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-‗IVRI 227, 243–50 (1987). 
 44. See CA 6370/00 Kal Binyan v. A.R.M. Rananah Bldg. & Leasing, Ltd. [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 
289, discussed infra at note 194. Haim Hermann Cohn, Divine Punishment, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
JUDAICA 708, 710 (Fred Skolnik & Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2007) (contending that an Israeli 
court under the influence of Jewish law should in some circumstances compel a litigant to go beyond 
the letter of the law). 
 45. See CA 350/77 Kitan Ltd. v. Weiss [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 785, 809, translated in MENACHEM 
ELON ET AL., JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT ‗IVRI): CASES AND MATERIALS 50 (1999) [hereinafter ELON 
CASEBOOK], and in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 581 (recommending that the defendants compensate 
the plaintiffs even though they are not legally obligated to do so). 
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and to what extent the defendant is liable as He knows everything, even 
each person‘s intentions, motives, and feelings.46  
Even if the proponents of Mishpat ‗Ivri can satisfactorily ignore the 
religious elements of Jewish law, they must still deal with many 
impractical aspects of that law. Justice Menachem Elon offers a definition 
of Mishpat ‗Ivri as including ―only those subjects covered in the parts of 
the Shulhan Arukh titled Even ha-Ezer and Hoshen Mishpat (plus certain 
‗legal‘ matters contained in the two other parts of the Shulhan Arukh, such 
as the law of usury in the part titled Yoreh De‟ah).‖47 Even Ha-Ezer deals 
primarily with marital issues; Hoshen Mishpat deals primarily with 
judicial procedure, torts, and various other monetary subjects.  
An examination of Hoshen Mishpat reveals some of the difficulties of 
incorporating it into Israeli law. The first section of Hoshen Mishpat 
delineates the jurisdiction of rabbinic courts. Although these courts have 
jurisdiction over injuries caused by a person to property, they lack power 
to collect much of the damage in cases of personal injury.
48
 They must 
instead place the defendant under a ban until he satisfies the plaintiff.
49
 
The second section of Hoshen Mishpat describes the emergency powers of 
the court:  
Any court, even those that lack ordination, that sees the people 
unrestrained in the commission of sins (and provided that the times 
require it), may adjudicate capital and monetary cases and all 
matters of punishment even if the matter lacks perfect testimony. If 
 
 
 46. RABBI MENACHEM MEIRI (1249-c. 1310), BEIT HA-BEHIRAH, commentary to B. Bava 
Kamma 56a (God, who knows what is in a person‘s heart, will exempt those who had absolutely no 
intention to cause harm.). See generally Dinei Shamayim, in 7 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 382, 395–96 
(1977) (conflicting opinions concerning the rights of a person to whom a Heavenly obligation is 
owed); Rabbi Michael Avraham, Ha‟im ha-Halakha hi “Mishpat „Ivri” [Is the Halakhah Mishpat 
„Ivri?], 15 AKDAMOT 141, 150 (2004) (limitations of liability in Jewish law can be explained because 
of belief in Divine justice). 
 47. 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 105.  
 48. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 1:1-3. When a person‘s body causes personal injury, 
Jewish law theoretically allows five types of damages, depending on the defendant‘s state of mind at 
the time of the wrongful act. The basic damage is nezek, the diminution in the value of the defendant—
determined as if he were valued in the slave market—caused by the injury. Although all defendants 
owe nezek regardless of the defendant‘s state of mind, the rabbinic court cannot collect it. If the 
defendant acts with inadvertence that is deemed close to intent, then the defendant is theoretically 
liable for pain, medical expense, and loss of time. If the defendant acted intentionally, he is 
theoretically liable also for humiliation. Of these elements, the rabbinic court lacks authority to collect 
pain and humiliation. 
 If a defendant‘s property causes personal injury (which would include damage caused by an 
animal or injury caused by an obstacle created by the defendant), then the only item theoretically 
allowed is nezek. Once again the rabbinical courts lack jurisdiction to collect these amounts. 
 49. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 1:5. 
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the defendant is violent, they may use non-Jewish authorities to 
strike him. All of their actions should be for the sake of 
Heaven. . . .
50
 
As Rabbi Joshua Falk explains in his commentary, if the society is law-
abiding except for the defendant, the court nonetheless has the power to 
punish him in this extralegal fashion.
51
 If, however, the court judges that 
the people are themselves unrestrained, it may establish its own rules to 
contain them and may punish all who violate the rules even if they are 
generally law-abiding.
52
 In short, the emergency powers of the court give 
it full authority to adopt rules necessary to preserve order in society. 
What is a secular court to make of these provisions? If the court 
restricts its jurisdiction as provided in section 1 of Hoshen Mishpat, in 
most tort cases it cannot collect judgments, but instead can only place 
defendants under a ban. The ban, which was designed to cut the defendant 
from social and religious ties with the community, would be ineffective in 
an urban, largely secular, society.
53
 If the secular court looks to section 2 
of the code, it has full license to adopt law as it sees fit to prevent ―sins,‖ 
provided it acts ―for the sake of Heaven.‖ Even if the court were to 
interpret this to mean that it can adopt measures within its competence that 
it deems necessary to prevent a breakdown of order as long as it acts 
without ulterior motive, the provision proves too much—the court already 
has that power.  
Thus, Justice Elon instead may not have meant to include the 
jurisdictional rules of Hoshen Mishpat in Mishpat ‗Ivri. Similarly, it is 
likely that Mishpat ‗Ivri will not include the evidence rules of formal 
Jewish law.
54
 According to Jewish law, parties are able to plead but they 
cannot testify. Two witnesses are required to establish most matters. 
Should two other witnesses contradict the first pair, the testimony is 
thrown out—because the judges do not weigh the credibility of the 
 
 
 50. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 2:1. The parenthetical language is the gloss added by 
Moses Isserles (1520–1572). 
 51. Rabbi Joshua Falk (1555–1614), Sefer Meirat Einayim, commentary to SHULHAN ARUKH, 
Hoshen Mishpat 2:1. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cf. IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 30–31 (1975) (In 
Israeli society, breach of a religious norm does not entail an organized sanction.). 
 54. Rabbinic courts possessed the power to adopt more lenient rules of evidence as part of their 
emergency powers or acting under the ―king‘s law.‖ E.g., RABBENU ASHER BEN YEHIEL (1250–1327), 
RESPONSA ROSH 107:6 [hereinafter ROSH]; CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin 
and the Penalties Within their Jurisdiction 24:1. See also SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 2:1; 
supra text accompanying note 50. See generally Haim Hermann Cohn & Yuval Sinai, Witness, in 21 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 115 (Fred Skolnik & Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
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witnesses.
55
 There are many restrictions on who can testify.
56
 For example, 
no person may be a valid witness if he is related to a certain degree to a 
party, has a financial interest in the outcome,
57
 or if he is not religiously 
observant.
58
 In a largely secular society, these rules would make it 
extremely difficult for most parties to present their claims. The matter is 
even more extreme in criminal cases. In addition to the rule that a person 
be warned by the victim before committing an offense,
59
 the trial court 
grills witnesses on small details and dismisses the case if there is 
inconsistent testimony.
60
 
One can respond that rabbinic courts in medieval times relaxed the 
restrictions described above in both criminal and civil cases. They did so, 
however, under their emergency powers or under the power of the king‘s 
law to devise rules for the proper ordering of society.
61
 Although this may 
show that an Israeli court follows in this tradition by following modern 
rules of procedure and evidence,
62
 there seems little point in using Jewish 
law merely to confirm the court‘s power. 
A court would also encounter many difficulties when applying Jewish 
law to torts. As I have shown elsewhere,
63
 in general, Jewish law 
significantly limits a tort defendant‘s liability as compared with modern 
 
 
 55. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 38. See Arnold Enker, Self-Incrimination in Jewish 
Law—A Review Essay, 4 DINÉ ISRAEL 107, 112–13 (1973). 
 56. See generally Cohn & Sinai, supra note 54. Among other restrictions, witnesses who are 
related to each other or to a judge may not testify. In general, only males over the age of thirteen can 
testify. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 33, 35. 
 57. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 33:10. See also id. at 7:12 (discussing the 
disqualification of judges). 
 58. A ―wicked‖ person may not testify, and a person is wicked if he has performed an act 
punishable by either lashes or death. Consequently, the ineligible include one who does not keep 
kosher or observe the Sabbath and holidays, and one who lends or borrows money on interest. 
Moreover, even if one otherwise valid witness knows that a second witness is ―wicked,‖ he may not 
testify even if he knows that the second witness would testify truthfully. Agnostics and heretics cannot 
testify, nor can non-Jews. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 34. 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 60. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 5:1 to :3. 
 61. Enker, supra note 13, at 1138–39. 
 62. See CrimA 543/79 Nagar v. State of Israel [1981] IsrSC 35(1) 113, 163–70 (Elon, J.) (using 
Jewish legal history to approve the use of circumstantial evidence and confessions in a murder case), 
translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 200, and in 1 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 396. See 
Avraham, supra note 46, at 153–54 (The formal law is ill-suited for a democratic and liberal state, and 
the principles of the king‘s law are the same as those of natural law.). 
 63. Steven F. Friedell, Some Observations on the Talmudic Law of Torts, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 897 
(1984). In that article, I speculated that limited liability may have come about in part because ―the 
Babylonian rabbis generally considered themselves without jurisdiction in tort cases.‖ Id. at 906. I now 
think that that was wrong because the rabbis‘ lack of jurisdiction only extended to collecting 
judgments. Rabbis continued to hear cases and impose bans on those liable until they paid an adequate 
sum to the plaintiff. See SHULHAN ARUKHL, Hoshen Mishpat 1:5. 
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systems. There is no respondeat superior liability in Jewish law.
64
 A 
defendant owes nothing for pain or medical expense unless he acted with a 
degree of inadvertence that borders intention.
65
 If a defendant creates an 
obstacle that injures a plaintiff, or if the defendant‘s animal injures a 
plaintiff, then the defendant owes nothing for medical care or pain.
66
 There 
is no liability under the laws of man for indirect damages.
67
 According to 
some, the plaintiff collects no recovery unless the defendant acts with 
greater fault than the plaintiff.
68
 Jewish law allows no damage in the case 
of wrongful death unless the defendant‘s vicious animal causes death, in 
which case the defendant would pay a fine to the decedent‘s family.69 If 
damage is caused by an obstruction created by the defendant, there is no 
liability for damage to inanimate objects.
70
 If damage is caused by fire, 
 
 
 64. B. Kiddushin 42b. See generally Aaron Kirschenbaum, A Cog in the Wheel: The Defence of 
“Obedience to Superior Orders” in Jewish Law, 4 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 168 (1974). 
 65. B. Bava Kamma 26a–27a; Rashi, B. Bava Kamma 26a at ―Nezek ‘In ‘Arba‗ah Devarim La.‖ 
If a person is suddenly knocked off a roof by a wind of normal velocity and he injures someone below, 
he is considered to have acted inadvertently but close to intentionally and is therefore liable for 
depreciation, pain, and medical expense. If, however, the wind is of unusual velocity, then he is 
considered to have acted under compulsion and is liable only for depreciation. If a person while sitting 
has a stone on his shirt of which he is unaware, he is considered to have acted under compulsion when 
he stands up and the stone falls on another. If he had known the stone was there but later forgot about 
it, he is considered to have acted inadvertently—but not inadvertently close to intentional—and is 
liable for depreciation only. B. Bava Kamma 26b. 
 66. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Damage by Chattels 7:3. 
 67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. There are three principal approaches to the 
problem of indirect damages. One is that liability is only imposed if the damages are clearly going to 
happen, if the defendant acted directly against the thing injured, and if the damage occurred 
immediately. Rabbenu Asher ben Yehiel (1250–1327) (―Rosh‖), commentary to B. Bava Batra 2:17; 
Rosh, commentary to B. Bava Kamma 9:13. Another approach was that liability was imposed only in 
situations that were a matter of common occurrence. See Tosafot, B. Bava Batra 22b, at ―Zot ‘Omeret 
Gerama Be-Nezakin ‘Asur‖ (view of the Ritzvah, Rabbi Isaac ben Abraham). The third approach was 
that there was liability only in situations where the damage was certain to happen. Nahmanides (c. 
1194–1270), Kuntres Dina Degarme, in HIDDUSHEI HARAMBAN 127 (Moshe Hirshler ed., 1969). 
There are many variations on these approaches, including one that says that indirect damages are not 
imposed when the defendant caused them inadvertently. Shakh, commentary to SHULHAN ARUKH, 
Hoshen Mishpat 386:1. The approaches retain sufficient flexibility to permit rabbinic courts to reach 
desired results. See generally Steven F. Friedell, Nobody‟s Perfect; Proximate Cause in American and 
Jewish Law, 25 HASTINGS INT‘L COMP. L. REV. 111, 120–33 (2002). 
 68. RABBI SOLOMON LURIA (1510–1574), YAM SHEL SHELOMO, commentary to Bava Kamma 
3:26; RABBI MENACHEM MEIRI (1249–1315), BETH HABEHIRA, commentary to Bava Kamma 26b-
27a; RABBI JONATHAN HA-KOHEN OF LUNEL (1135–1210), PERUSH R. YONATAN HA-KOHEN ME-
LUNEL LE-BAVA KAMMA 73 (S. Friedman ed., 1969). 
 69. See CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Damage by Chattels 10:2 to :4 (fine due when 
animal killed on three prior occasions); CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Wounding and 
Damaging 4:5 (no wrongful death damages due when a person kills another); B. Bava Kamma 26a (no 
ransom to be paid); B. Ketubot 35a (no damages to be paid). A ―vicious‖ animal is one that caused 
similar damage on at least three prior occasions, provided the owner has received proper warning. 
 70. B. Bava Kamma 54b. 
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there is no liability for the destruction of concealed property.
71
 Jewish law 
does not recognize the concept of the ―eggshell skull‖ so that a defendant 
causing personal injury is only liable for damage that ordinarily results.
72
 
When damages are allowed, Jewish law limits liability by measuring 
damages in a way that intentionally favors the tortfeasor.
73
 For example, 
damages for pain are measured by how much a person would pay to avoid 
having to endure the pain.
74
 Damages to crops or trees are also measured 
in a way that limits liability.
75
 
In the case of medical malpractice, the defendant‘s exposure is even 
less under the classical sources of Jewish law. The Shulhan Arukh 
provides that if a physician mistakenly injures a patient, a licensed 
physician is not liable for hurting a patient under the laws of man but 
might be liable under the laws of Heaven.
76
 If a physician causes a 
patient‘s death, then the physician might be liable for exile under the laws 
of Heaven.
77
 Although some rabbis in the latter part of the twentieth 
century widened the physician‘s liability through liberal interpretation of 
the classical sources,
78
 others adhere to the older view.
79
 
In some other respects Jewish law favors the tort victim in comparison 
with Western legal systems. It does not have a statute of limitations 
applicable to tort claims.
80
 As we have seen, it recognizes a religious 
obligation to compensate in some instances where no legal obligation 
exists,
81
 and it imposes a religious obligation to appease tort victims even 
if compensation is paid.
82
 Moreover, the rabbinic court is required to 
instruct the defendant about these religious obligations.
83
 Even if a secular 
court could successfully strip away the religious elements, one would be 
left with a legal system that would be impractical. 
 
 
 71. B. Bava Kamma 61b. 
 72. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 420:2.  
 73. B. Bava Kamma 47a; RABBI SOLOMON LURIA (1510–1574), YAM SHEL SHLOMO, 
commentary to Bava Kamma 8:1. 
 74. B. Bava Kamma 85a. 
 75. B. Bava Kamma 58b. 
 76. SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh Deah 336:1.  
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally Steven F. Friedell, Medical Malpractice in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to 
External Norms and Practices, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1 (2006). 
 79. See J. David Bleich, Medical Malpractice and Jewish Law, 39 TRADITION 72, 88–90 (2005); 
Hovel, in 12 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 679, 743 (1974). 
 80. Supra text accompanying note 26. 
 81. Supra text accompanying note 28. 
 82. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 422:1. 
 83. See 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 147. 
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One might be tempted to think that there is precedent in Jewish history 
for separating religious and secular law and avoiding the impracticalities 
of Jewish law. In Talmudic and post-Talmudic times, rabbis and Jewish 
communities recognized that much of the Formal Law was impractical and 
devised a supplemental legal system based on emergency powers and the 
power of a Jewish king.
84
 This poses a serious difficulty for the proponents 
of Mishpat ‗Ivri. Should they restrict their sources of Jewish law to that of 
the Formal Law, they would be left with a highly impractical system. 
Should they instead choose to adopt the rules of the Jewish communities 
in the Talmudic and post-Talmudic periods (generally up until the end of 
the eighteenth century), they would need criteria for deciding which of 
these rules to apply and might still be left with rules that would seem 
highly impractical today. Should they instead adopt only the view that the 
Knesset and the courts have the power as representatives of the Jewish 
community to adopt rules necessary for the governance of the state, the 
entire concept of Mishpat ‗Ivri would collapse as the Knesset and the 
courts already have those powers. 
Mishpat ‗Ivri, an amalgam of all of these approaches, uses the full 
range of Jewish law to shed light on issues presented.
85
 Justice Barak 
offered a possible answer to the problems posed in this part of the Article 
when he explained that Israeli courts use Jewish law not ―as a normative 
system from which we seek a binding rule, but only as a storehouse from 
which we seek enlightenment.‖86 Although this approach gives the Israeli 
judge power to translate religious norms into secular ones and to avoid 
Jewish law when it does not meet society‘s needs, this approach can also 
give rise to some problems. It can result in taking Jewish law concepts out 
of context and reading modern concepts into Jewish law. We will treat 
these issues in the next part of this Article.  
 
 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 14–15. 
 85. E.g., CA 418/03 Osem Food Indus., Ltd. v. Samja [2004] IsrSC 59(3) 541, 574 (Automobile 
no-fault statute is supported by the Knesset‘s power to make rules under the king‘s law.); CrimA 
877/84 Gali v. State of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 169 (using formal law of robbery); Nagar, IsrSC 
35(1) at 163–70 (using Jewish communities‘ use of circumstantial evidence).  
 86. CA 546/78 Bank Kupat AM v. Hendeles [1980] IsrSC 34(3) 57, 67, translated in ELON 
CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 331, and in 1 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 7. See Tennenbaum, supra 
note 21, at 421 (endorsing this approach).  
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III. SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH MISHPAT ‗IVRI 
A. Law Out of Context 
Whenever a court cites an earlier decision it always takes the earlier 
case out of context to some degree because no two cases are the same. 
There are, however, some situations where the supposed precedent arose 
in such a different legal setting that it is not helpful to rely upon it. A 
Jewish law rule that appears to be relevant might turn out upon closer 
examination to have such different elements and functions that it does not 
fit into the Israeli legal system. Also, courts might cite Jewish law for the 
proposition that a certain act is wrongful but ignore details of Jewish law 
that eliminate or mitigate the wrong. This part of the Article will examine 
some Israeli cases where this has occurred.  
1. Robbery v. Theft 
In Gali v. State of Israel,
87
 the defendant snatched a box of diamonds 
worth about $500,000 from the foreman of a diamond-polishing plant who 
was standing in the plant‘s courtyard. The foreman was taken by surprise 
and did not resist, although he and another then chased Gali without 
success. The police later apprehended Gali, and he was convicted of 
robbery and sentenced for up to ten years imprisonment.
88
 Gali argued that 
his crime, if any, consisted of theft. Under Israeli statutes, a person 
convicted of robbery can be imprisoned for up to fourteen years,
89
 
increased by an additional six years if there are aggravating 
circumstances.
90
 Gali would have faced a maximum sentence of only three 
years had he been convicted of theft.
91
 Instead, he was convicted under a 
1977 statute: ―A person who steals a thing, and at the time of the act or 
immediately before or immediately thereafter, carries out or threatens to 
carry out an act of violence to any person or property in order to obtain or 
 
 
 87. Gali, IsrSC 40(4) at 169, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 217, and in 2 
RAKOVER supra note 45, at 732. 
 88. Four years of that sentence were conditional. He was also sentenced for conspiracy and 
extortion. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for conspiracy. Id. at 177–79, translated in 
ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 218. 
 89. Penal Law, 5737-1977, Special Volume LSI 8 § 402(a) (1977) (Isr.). The penalties prescribed 
in the statute are maximums. Id. § 35. In rabbinic Hebrew the word for robbery is gezeilah. The Penal 
Law uses a different word, shod. 
 90. The penalty is increased if the defendant uses a dangerous weapon or if he acted in a group, 
wounded or struck a person, or committed some other act of violence against a person. Penal Law 
§ 402(b). 
 91. Penal Law § 384. 
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retain the thing . . . is said to commit robbery . . . .‖92 An earlier statute 
made ―actual violence‖ an element of robbery.93 Israeli cases construing 
the 1977 statute state that merely snatching an object from another is theft, 
but if the owner of the object expressed active resistance, then the crime 
was robbery.
94
 Although this rule had substantial support in England
95
 and 
the United States,
96
 others criticized it on the grounds that it ―put a 
premium on criminal skill and adroitness.‖97  
A three-judge panel of the Israeli Supreme Court upheld Gali‘s 
conviction, each justice employing different reasoning.
98
 Justice Elon 
thought that there was a difference between ―actual violence‖ and 
―violence,‖ and that snatching an object from another who is aware of the 
taking constitutes ―violence.‖ He also wrote that this was consistent with 
Jewish law. He quoted parts of Maimonides‘s definitions of these acts: 
Who is a thief? One who takes someone‘s money secretly, without 
the knowledge of the owner . . . . But if he takes it openly and 
publicly by force, then he is considered not a thief but a robber.
 
Who is a robber? One who takes someone‘s money by force, such 
as snatching an object from his hand.
99
 
 
 
 92. Penal Law § 402(a). A slightly different translation appears in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 
45, at 218. 
 93. Criminal Code Ordinance, Ch. XXXII, art. 387 (Palestine 1936). This statute, adopted during 
the British mandate over Palestine, was based on the Cyprus Criminal Code and the Queensland 
Criminal Code of 1899, which in turn sought to codify English common law. Norman Abrams, 
Interpreting the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936—The Untapped Well, 7 ISR. L. REV. 25 (1972). A 
later English statute uses the word ―force‖ rather than ―violence.‖ Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60 § 8(1). 
 94. CrimA 707/83 Patromelio v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(4) 821; CrimA 524/82 Vadrad v. 
State of Israel [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 553; CrimA 70/73 Elharar v. State of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(2) 561. 
See also CrimA 877/84 Gali v. State of Israel [1986], IsrSC 40(4) 169, 181–82, translated in ELON 
CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 219. 
 95. See J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 504 (5th ed. 1983). In R. v. Dawson, 
(1977) 64 Crim. App. 170, the court said that the jury should be left to decide whether jostling a victim 
to cause him to lose his balance constituted the use of force. 
 96. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 696–97 
(1972). 
 97. See Gali, IsrSC 40(4) at 182 (quoting People v. Santiago, 405 N.Y.S.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1978)), translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 219. 
 98. Justice Levin concurred, saying that although there was no difference between ―violence‖ 
and ―actual violence,‖ it was enough for the crime of robbery that the defendant committed a forceful 
physical act against the victim. Id. at 204, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 221. 
Justice Barak concurred saying that the facts met the requirements for actual violence. Id. at 207, 
translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 222. 
 99. Id. at 199 (quoting CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Theft 1:3 and CODE OF 
MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Robbery and Lost Property 1:3), translated in ELON CASEBOOK, 
supra note 45, at 220–21.  
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Justice Elon‘s reliance on Jewish law was misplaced. Jewish law 
defines the two wrongs differently from the way Israeli law does. In 
Jewish law, theft is committed in secret whereas robbery is committed 
openly without concealing the appropriation of the goods.
100
 Although in 
his legal code Maimonides includes the use of force in the definition of 
robbery, he includes the examples of one who ―enters another‘s premises 
without his permission and takes articles . . . or if one enters another‘s 
field and eats its produce.‖101 Maimonides also said that a person who 
picks up a lost article and fails to return it violates the commandment 
forbidding robbery,
102
 as does an employer who delays paying wages.
103
 
The common element appears to be an act of misappropriation that is 
brazen, meaning it is done while the actor knows he is likely to be 
observed. In the Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides does not mention 
the element of force but says that only things that are in the open can be 
robbed.
104
 A more recent code, the Arukh Ha-Shulhan, rules that an armed 
bandit would be a robber if he takes the property in public and in front of 
the owners, but he would be a thief if he does so in a closed place and his 
victims hide in fear while their property is stolen.
105
 By contrast, theft 
 
 
 100. See Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein, ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 348:4; SHULHAN 
ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 348:3. The Arukh Ha-Shulhan does not mention the use of force in its law of 
robbery, saying only that if someone takes another‘s property openly and in public he is a robber and 
not a thief. Id. Even if he enters another‘s house while the owner is away he commits robbery if he 
removes the objects from the house in an open manner. See CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning 
Robbery and Lost Property 4:12; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 364:2.  
 The classic Talmudic discussion of these wrongs contains two views of the difference between a 
thief and a robber. According to one view, a person who hides in order to steal something is a thief. 
The other view is that if one hides so well that the owner is not aware of his identity when the objects 
are stolen, he is not a robber but a thief. According to this view, if he hides only so that his victims 
should not flee with their property, he is a robber. B. Bava Kamma 79b. See also BERNARD S. 
JACKSON, THEFT IN EARLY JEWISH LAW 26–28 (1972); MOSES JUNG, THE JEWISH LAW OF THEFT 
(1929), reprinted in 4 ABRAHAM M. FUSS, STUDIES IN JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE (1976).  
 The Jerusalem Talmud contained a rule: ―If one stole before witnesses, he is a thief, and if he did 
so before the owner, he is a robber.‖ J. Sanhedrin 8:3, 11:2. Later Jewish law differed in two respects: 
witnesses who are not parties to the case are necessary to impose liability for any tort unless the 
defendant admits liability, and as shown above, it is not necessary for robbery to be in the presence of 
the owners as long as the stolen goods are not concealed. Nonetheless, the statement captures the idea 
that secrecy, or the lack thereof, is all that distinguishes theft from robbery. In Gali, Justice Elon 
mistakenly said that robbery in Jewish law requires the awareness of the victim. IsrSC 40(4) at 199, 
translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 221, and in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 733. 
 101. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Robbery and Lost Property 1:3. 
 102. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Robbery and Lost Property 11:2. See also 
SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 259:1. 
 103. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Hiring 11:2 (based on B. Bava Metzia 111a). See 
CA 719/78 Ilit, Ltd. v. Elko, Ltd. [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 673, 686 (Elon, J.), translated in 1 RAKOVER, 
supra note 19, at 475; see also SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 359:7. 
 104. MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3:41. 
 105. ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 348:4. 
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under Israeli law need not be in secret, and robbery need not be done 
openly. Instead, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive an owner 
of his property and a carrying away of that property without the owner‘s 
consent;
106
 robbery consists of theft committed by violence or threat of 
violence to persons or property.
107
 Although the two systems‘ definitions 
overlap, they are not the same.
108
  
Even if Israeli law had adopted Jewish law‘s definition of theft and 
robbery, Gali‘s reliance on Jewish law would have been ironic. Jewish law 
imposes greater liability on thieves than on robbers, the opposite of the 
view taken by the Israeli statute. In Jewish law a robber only has to return 
the stolen object or pay its value.
109
 By contrast, a thief ordinarily has to 
pay the owner double. Moreover, if he steals a sheep or ox and then either 
sells it or slaughters it, he has to pay the owner four or five times the value 
of the animal.
110
  
The Jewish law of theft and robbery serves both religious and practical 
goals. The Talmud teaches that one who steals in secret compounds his 
offense by demonstrating a greater fear of man than he does of God, 
thinking that God is less powerful than man.
111
 In his Guide for the 
Perplexed, Maimonides explains the matter in practical terms, reasoning 
that there is a greater need to deter theft than robbery.
112
 He explains that 
robbery is less common than theft and that it is harder to identify a person 
who steals in secret. He further explains that the law imposes a higher 
penalty for stealing a sheep or ox because owners usually leave them 
outside, making them easier to steal, and if the thief sells or slaughters the 
 
 
 106. Penal Law § 383(a)(1). It is also theft to deceitfully use property that is in his possession for 
another lawful purpose. Penal Law § 383(a)(2). Although the Israeli law distinction between theft and 
robbery parallels the treatment in the United States, there are some parallels in United States law to the 
Jewish law approach. See Rhodes v. State, 580 So. 2d 92, 94 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (―[L]arceny is 
secret in nature . . . .‖); Commonwealth v. Davis, 66 S.W. 27, 27 (1902) (―Larceny . . . is accomplished 
secretly, or by surprise or fraud.‖). 
 107. Penal Law § 402.  
 108. The difference between the two legal systems may be illustrated as follows: if a person 
sneaks into another‘s home while the owners are away, destroys a locked box in order to remove its 
contents, and then conceals the loot in a bag and sneaks out again, Jewish law would see this as theft 
but Israeli law would see it as robbery. Jewish law would consider it theft because it was done in 
secret; Israeli law would see it as robbery because of the violence in breaking the property. By 
contrast, if a person steals a purse left on a park bench in full view of the owner, Jewish law would 
consider this to be robbery while Israeli law would see it as theft. It would be robbery under Jewish 
law because it was done in the open but would be theft in Israeli law because no violence occurred. 
 109. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Robbery and Lost Property 1:5. 
 110. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Theft 1:6.  
 111. B. Bava Kamma 79b. 
 112. MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3:41. 
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animal it would be hard to catch the thief.
113
 Israel has taken a different 
approach. It sees a greater need to deter and punish those who use force or 
the threat of force to steal.
114
  
The Israeli Supreme Court was within its rights to conclude that the 
Knesset intended to severely punish purse-snatchers and the like.
115
 Justice 
Elon said that such acts have become common and can result in the 
victim‘s death.116 However, in seeking support in Jewish law‘s definition 
of robbery, Gali takes Jewish law out of context. Gali‘s act constituted 
robbery under Jewish law for different reasons than those required by the 
Israeli statute. Moreover, it is ironic that the court relied on Jewish law, 
which treats robbers leniently. 
A district court made better use of Jewish law in State of Israel v. 
Grachin,
117
 where the defendants tricked an elderly man and his elderly 
sister to go into a room on the pretense that the defendants were about to 
purchase some jewelry. The defendants locked the two in the room and 
stole the jewelry and some other items. The defendants did not use force 
or threats. The District Court upheld a conviction for robbery, determining 
that the act involved ―violence‖ in part because the common usage of that 
word described what took place. The court said that as long as the victims 
were aware of what the defendants were intending to do and opposed it, 
the act would be robbery. It held that the fear imposed on the victims 
would be enough to satisfy the statutory term ―violence.‖ In doing so the 
court cited a source of Jewish law that defined a violent person as ―a 
strong person who does not listen to the bet din (religious court) and 
 
 
 113. Id. The practical and religious concerns also explain the rule in Jewish law that a thief who 
admitted his offense was liable for the value of the stolen object but exempt from paying the fine. 
CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Theft 1:5. The admission removes the difficulty of 
identifying the thief, and it is a step in atoning for the religious offense. 
 114. Israel also punishes more severely theft committed by types of people who abuse a 
relationship of trust, such as employees stealing from their employers (seven years), public employees 
stealing public property (ten years), officers and directors stealing from the corporation (seven years), 
and those acting under a power of attorney under certain circumstances (seven years). Penal Law 
§§ 390–393. Although these kinds of thefts are often done in secret, secrecy is not an element of the 
offense. Penalties for these thefts are less than the penalty for robbery. Cattle thieves face up to four 
years of imprisonment. Penal Law § 393a. 
 115. Justice Elon stressed in his opinion that the law ought not to reward professional criminals 
who steal goods suddenly without the victim‘s resistance. Still, his decision would classify an ―expert‖ 
pickpocket a thief, not a robber. CrimA 877/84 Gali v. State of Israel [1986], IsrSC 40(4) 169, 196–97, 
translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 219. 
 116. Id. at 198, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 220. See also Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 484 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. 1984) (―A victim who is aware of the taking of property from his 
person is apt to reflex action to protect himself and his property and thus may be injured by the 
felon.‖). 
 117. CrimC (TA) 869/81 [1983] IsrDC (1) 265, rev‟d sub nom. CrimA 524/82 Vadrad v. State of 
Israel [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 553. 
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whom people fear.‖118 The court did not try to determine whether the act 
would have constituted robbery under Jewish law.
119
  
The issue in both Gali and Grachin was the meaning of the term 
―violence‖ and how Jewish law might help to shed light on the 
definition.
120
 Even that inquiry was risky, however, as words do not have a 
static meaning but one that varies with context.  
A better way to use Jewish law is to explicitly apply Maimonides‘s 
idea that the Torah imposed a more severe sanction on thieves because it 
was more common for people to steal in secret than in the open, and 
because it was harder to catch thieves than robbers. Today it happens that 
theft committed by means of violence is a more serious crime. 
Nonetheless, the principle that a more severe sanction attaches to a more 
serious violation remains the same. Gali makes sense under Maimonides‘s 
rationale if the Knesset concluded that purse-snatching had become as 
common and as serious a problem as asserted by Justice Elon.
121
 It is less 
obvious that the acts in Grachin are of that nature.  
2. Sabbath Driving 
Horev v. Minister of Transportation
122
 illustrates another ironic use of 
Jewish law. The case involved an order by the Ministry of Transportation 
to close a certain Jerusalem street to all vehicular traffic except for 
emergency purposes during times of prayer on Sabbaths and religious 
holidays. The street was in a largely religious neighborhood, and its 
closure caused minor disruptions to non-observant travelers. The issue for 
the court was whether the order was valid in that it infringed on the right 
to travel. The court needed to balance the interests of some people‘s right 
to travel against the protection of other people‘s religious sensibilities.  
A majority of the court voted to strike down the order because the 
Ministry of Transportation had not adequately considered the interests of 
the neighborhood‘s non-observant residents.123 Unsurprisingly, some 
 
 
 118. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Alam, 2 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 11 (1976)), translated in 2 RAKOVER, 
supra note 19, at 878. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 98:4. 
 119. It would have been theft under Jewish law according to the Arukh Ha-Shulhan. See supra 
note 105 and accompanying text. 
 120. In Gali, Justice Elon also found Jewish law helpful in defining the term by finding the source 
for the word in Aramaic as used in the Talmud. IsrSC 40(4) at 193, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra 
note 19, at 732. 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 122. HCJ 5016/96 [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1, translated in [1997] IsrLR 149. 
 123. Id., translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 230. The court split 3–3–1 on the merits. Three justices 
would have struck down the order entirely; three thought that the transport ministry needed to consider 
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justices cited Jewish law to show the centrality of Sabbath observance to 
Jewish life.
124
 For example, the Talmud said, ―Jerusalem was destroyed 
only because [they] desecrated the Sabbath therein.‖125 Surprisingly, one 
justice used Jewish law to show the importance of the public‘s right to use 
public roads.
126
 Justice Cheshin quoted the Mishnah, ―[h]e whose field is 
traversed by a public path and he closed it, substituting [another path] at 
the side, forfeits that which he has given, and [that which he has 
appropriated as] his does not pass into his possession.‖127 As Justice 
Cheshin observed, Jewish law forbids a person from taking part of a public 
way even if he gives a path in exchange.
128
  
Part of the difficulty with Mishpat ‗Ivri is that the premises of Jewish 
law differ from those of Israeli law. Jewish law has a religious premise: it 
preserves an orderly society to enable the Jewish people to fulfill their 
other obligations to God. Jewish law starts not with the right to travel but 
with the obligation to observe the Sabbath to thereby honor God.
129
 Unless 
a person‘s life is in danger, one‘s liberty to travel on the Sabbath, even if it 
involves only walking, is limited, as one may not go more than two 
thousand cubits beyond a town‘s limits.130 By contrast, Israel places a 
greater emphasis on promoting individual liberties.
131
 As applied to the 
issue in Horev, a modern democracy places a high value on the right to 
travel and the right of each individual to choose whether to practice a 
religion. Therefore each person‘s right to decide whether to travel on the 
Sabbath can only be limited if justified by some great public need.
132
  
 
 
the views of non-observant residents who were affected by the closure; one justice would have 
supported a closure of the road during the entire Sabbath and holidays but to prevent a deadlock voted 
to allow the transport ministry to reconsider the closure. Id. 
 124. Id. at 43 (Barak, J.), translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 195; id. at 181–82 (Tal, J.), translated in 
[1997] IsrLR 149, 375–78.  
 125. Id. at 181 (Tal, J.) (citing B. Shabbat 119b), translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 377. 
 126. Id. at 151 (Cheshin, J.), translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 325. 
 127. MISHNAH, Bava Batra 6:7. 
 128. Horev, IsrSC 51(4) at 151, translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 334–35. 
 129. See, e.g., Exodus 16:29 (prohibition against travel on the Sabbath); Exodus 20:10 (Sabbath 
observance to remember creation); Deuteronomy 5:14 (Sabbath observance to remember redemption 
from Egypt). 
 130. SHULHAN ARUKH, Orah Chayyim 397:1. See generally 10 JEWISH ENCLYCLOPEDIA 600 
(1905). Even though travel within a town‘s limits is not prohibited, and even though riding on an 
animal on the Sabbath is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, the Talmud records that a rabbinic court 
once stoned a man to death for riding on a horse on the Sabbath. B. Sanhedrin 46a. 
 131. Horev also involved the right of non-observant Israelis to be free from religion. Even though 
Judaism recognizes the notion of free will when it comes to religious belief and practice, Judaism 
considers observance to be obligatory, not optional.  
 132. Horev, IsrSC 51(4) at 52–53, translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 206–07. 
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Justice Cheshin‘s opinion appears to view Jewish law as if it is a 
collection of distinct rules from which one can pick and choose. Although 
Jewish law protects the public‘s right to travel, it does not protect the right 
to use public roads in violation of the Sabbath. In a similar way, using 
Jewish law‘s reverence for the Sabbath to support the street closure also 
causes a strange result. As Justice Tal observed, closing the street would 
result in drivers taking longer routes that would cause an even greater 
desecration of the Sabbath.
133
  
For those who want Israel to be a purely secular state, Justice 
Cheshin‘s use of Jewish law would seem proper. Jewish law protects the 
right to travel—a secular issue—and one can ignore what Jewish law has 
to say about Sabbath travel. Those opposed to imposing religious 
restrictions on non-believers might delight in the irony that the public‘s 
right to use roads is protected by Jewish law. Even some who are 
religiously observant might approve of the reasoning that allows each 
person to choose whether and how to observe the Sabbath. However, if the 
purpose of Mishpat ‗Ivri is to help unify the people by grounding legal 
decisions in the Jewish heritage, the use of Jewish law here might be 
counterproductive. Some might be offended by the use of Jewish law to 
promote a violation of the Sabbath that interferes with another‘s 
observance of the Sabbath. It seems very doubtful that Jewish law can 
successfully resolve the issue in Horev. 
3. Negligent Misrepresentation 
The case of Amidar National Co. for Immigrant Housing in Israel v. 
Aharon
134
 is an example of a court applying a liability rule of Jewish law 
without regard for the limitations that Jewish law imposes. In that case, a 
new immigrant sought to open a workshop where he could operate as a 
locksmith. He sought the assistance of Amidar, a company partly owned 
by the Israeli government that specializes in providing real estate to new 
immigrants. Amidar‘s employee, Abraham Zaken, helped Aharon find a 
site that it rented to him on the condition that he use it only for a 
locksmith‘s business. The lease contained an exculpatory clause stating 
that Aharon would be solely responsible for any liabilities arising from his 
use of the property and that he would hold Amidar blameless. It turned out 
that the property was not zoned for use as a locksmith shop. The neighbors 
 
 
 133. Id. at 179, translated in [1997] IsrLR 149, 364. 
 134. CA 86/76 [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 337, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 145, and 
in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 544. 
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complained, and Aharon was convicted and ordered to close his shop. He 
relocated his business and sued Amidar for several items of damage. The 
district court disallowed some items for insufficient evidence but awarded 
damages for loss of business before he was required to close the shop, for 
lost business from the time the old business was closed until his new shop 
was opened one hundred days later, and for temporary reduction in 
clientele.
135
 The district court found that Amidar had been negligent and 
was liable for its negligent misrepresentation. In doing so it relied on an 
Israeli Supreme Court case that imposed liability for an expert‘s negligent 
misrepresentation but which left open the possibility that non-experts 
might not have such liability.
136
 The district court agreed with the 
dissenting judgment in a Privy Council case that said that non-experts and 
experts should be subject to the same liability and also ruled that the 
exculpatory clause was ineffective.
137
 
The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Landau agreed with the district 
court‘s reasoning and suggested that perhaps a non-expert had an even 
greater responsibility.
138
 This was dictum, however, as Justice Landau 
thought that Amidar was an expert.
139
 Justice Cohn concurred, pointing 
out that Aharon had reason to believe that Amidar was an arm of the 
State.
140
 He did not address the issue of a non-expert‘s liability. Justice 
Elon also concurred in the judgment and attempted to show that the 
liability of both the expert and non-expert for negligent misrepresentation 
was consistent with Jewish law.  
Justice Elon traced the development of Jewish law in this area from the 
Talmud to the latest code of Jewish law at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The core text in the Talmud reads: 
It was stated: If a denar was shown to a moneychanger [and he 
recommended it as good] but it was subsequently found to be bad, 
in one Baraitha it was taught that if he was an expert he would be 
exempt but if an amateur he would be liable, whereas in another 
Baraitha it was taught that whether he was an expert or an amateur 
he would be liable. R. Papa stated: The ruling that in the case of an 
 
 
 135. Id. at 342. The district court mistakenly calculated the lost time as 125 days, but the matter 
was corrected by the Supreme Court. 
 136. CA 106/54 Weinstein v. Kadimah [1954] IsrSC 8 1317. 
 137. Mutual Life & Citizens‘ Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793, 810 (P.C. 1970) (appeal 
taken from High Ct. of Aust.) (U.K.). 
 138. Amidar, IsrSC 32(2) at 341, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 146. 
 139. Id., translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 146. 
 140. Id. at 343, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 147. 
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expert he would be exempt refers to [people such] as Dankcho and 
Issur who needed no [further] instruction whatever, but who made a 
mistake regarding a new stamp at the time when the coin had just 
. . . come from the mint. 
 There was a certain woman who showed a denar to R. Hiyya 
and he told her that it was good. Later she again came to him and 
said to him, ‗I afterwards showed it [to others] and they said to me 
that it was bad, and in fact I could not pass it.‘ He therefore said to 
Rab: Go forth and change it for a good one and write down in my 
register that this was a bad business. But why [should he be 
different from] Dankcho and Issur who would be exempt because 
they needed no instruction? Surely R. Hiyya also needed no 
instruction?—R. Hiyya acted [beyond the letter of the law]. Resh 
Lakish showed a denar to R. Eleazar who told him that it was good. 
He said to him: You see that I rely upon you. He replied: Suppose 
you do rely on me, what of it? Do you think that if it is found bad I 
would have to exchange it [for a good one]? Did not you yourself 
state that it was [only] R. Meir who adjudicates liability in an action 
for damage done indirectly, which apparently means that it was only 
R. Meir who maintained so whereas we did not hold in accordance 
with his view?—But he said to him: No; R. Meir maintained so and 
we hold with him.
141
 
Post-Talmudic authorities differed over the proper interpretation of this 
text, as to the effect of payment upon the duty owed and whether a duty 
was owed even if the plaintiff did not explicitly state that he relied on the 
moneychanger.
142
 A late nineteenth-century code of Jewish law, the Arukh 
Ha-Shulhan, sums up the matter this way: 
Liability arises not only when some actual act is done but also, at 
times, when a mere statement is made, such as when a coin is 
shown to a moneychanger to ascertain whether it is good and 
acceptable, and the latter says it is good but it is found to be bad or 
counterfeit. If payment is made for the opinion, the moneychanger 
is liable to make restitution; if not he is free from liability, provided 
he is an expert and requires no instruction. If, however, he is not an 
expert, he is liable [even when he receives no payment]. A 
 
 
 141. B. Bava Kamma 99b–100a (based on the Soncino translation). 
 142. Amidar, IsrSC 32(2) at 351–56, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 150–53, 
and in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 547–51. 
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moneychanger is liable when he is relied upon expressly or by 
implication. Otherwise he may say that he did not know that 
reliance was placed on him alone without consulting others and 
therefore he was not meticulous in examining the coin. Others 
maintain that even if nothing was explicitly said he is also liable, 
because all who show a coin to a moneychanger implicitly rely 
upon him completely. The Rema wrote that the former 
interpretation is correct. When payment is made, even if there was 
no express reliance, such reliance is implied. This obligation arises 
because of the law of indirect causation . . . .
143
 
There are several difficulties with applying these sources to Amidar. 
First, as mentioned earlier,
144
 Jewish law has no concept of respondeat 
superior and so would not hold Amidar liable. Further, the rabbinic 
sources discussed by the Court do not speak about negligence. The expert 
who requires no further instruction is not liable if not paid; the paid expert 
is liable, as is the amateur whether paid or not, provided there is adequate 
reliance.
145
 The standard is strict liability, not negligence.
146
 There was no 
showing that Aharon paid for the advice, only that he rented a store from 
Amidar. Consequently, if Aharon had sued Zaken, and if Zaken was an 
expert requiring no further instruction, then Jewish law would have denied 
liability. If Aharon had paid Zaken or if Zaken were regarded as not 
sufficiently expert, then Zaken would have been liable even if not 
negligent. Moreover, Jewish law severely limits liability for indirect 
damages. In the moneychanger cases cited by Justice Elon, the damages 
were limited to the value of the coin itself. As Rabbi Eleazar said to Resh 
Lakish, ―[d]o you think that if it is found bad I would have to exchange it 
[for a good one]?‖147 In other contexts some rabbinic authorities do not 
impose liability for lost profits; other authorities do, but only if the 
damages are clearly and certainly caused by the defendant.
148
 If these 
 
 
 143. ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 306:13. 
 144. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 146. On whether the concept of negligence exists in Jewish law, see infra text accompanying 
notes 178–91. 
 147. See supra note 141. 
 148. See 10 PISKEI DIN YERUSHALAYIM [DECISIONS OF THE JERUSALEM RABBINICAL COURT] 
273, 277–79 (2006) (In light of the conflict among the sources, damages are due only under the laws 
of Heaven for rents that the buyer of an apartment lost as a result of seller‘s failure to make repairs.); 
ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 292:20 (liable where damages are clear); RABBI ARYEH LEIB 
HA-COHEN, KETZOT HA-HOSHEN 333:2 (lost profits not allowed for damage to property but allowed 
in case of personal injury); RABBI YAIR BACHRACH, RESPONSA HAVOT YAIR 151 (Bailee who hired a 
horse for eight days and was prevented from returning for it for a month is not liable for the owner‘s 
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theories of liability were applied to Amidar, Aharon would have been 
compensated for the rent he paid, but probably not for his consequential 
damages.  
Jewish law appears to seek the least penalty necessary to deter conduct 
that might cause harm. Lack of respondeat superior liability means that 
liability will rest solely upon the person most immediately responsible for 
the injury. Also, limiting liability for misrepresentation is consistent with 
Jewish law‘s policy of measuring damages in a manner favorable to 
tortfeasors.
149
  
Moreover, any legal system that regulates misrepresentation needs to 
balance two conflicting interests: the desire to protect innocent plaintiffs 
who have been harmed by relying on false statements and the desire to 
protect defendants from unlimited liability for unintentional 
misstatement.
150
 In confronting this problem, Jewish law imposes strict 
liability but balances this by imposing limited liability solely upon the 
person who made the misstatement and by imposing no liability on unpaid 
experts. By contrast, Israeli and English law expose the speaker and his 
employer to a wider range of damages but require a showing of 
negligence. A court needs to be careful not to upset the delicate balance of 
these interests by mixing elements of law from different systems.
151
 
 
 
lost profits.); RABBI BENJAMIN SALNIK, RESPONSA MASAT BINYAMIN 28 (There is liability where 
defendant prevented a person from paying a sum of money which he would otherwise have been 
compelled to pay.); RABBI SOLOMON LURIA, YAM SHEL SHLOMO, commentary to Bava Kamma 9:30 
(no liability for lost profits); RABBI MEIR BEN BARUCH, RESPONSA MAHARAM OF ROTHENBERG 4:821 
(Prague ed.) (no liability for lost profits). See generally Gerama Be-Nezakin, Geramei, 6 TALMUDIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 461, 483 (1975). 
 In CC (Jer) 2220/00 Mifalei Te‘urah v. Israel Postal Auth. [2003] IsrDC Tak-Makh 2003(2) 
16,627 (Drori, J.), the court awarded compensation for lost profits after a bid for the construction of 
mailboxes that was improperly awarded to another company that lacked the qualifications to fulfill the 
order. The court gave several reasons why this should also be the case under Jewish law: rabbinic 
legislation ought to impose liability because the damages were of a kind that was common, the 
defendant was a public authority and ought to do the right thing, a public authority‘s Heavenly 
obligation can be enforced, and to prevent future breaches of this kind. The court said that under the 
1980 Foundations of Law Act, it was required to apply the principles of Jewish law but not necessarily 
the decisions that would be reached under Jewish law. Id. ¶ 104. See also Moshe Drori, Liability for 
Indirect Damage and Lost Profits, 26 TECHUMIN 341, 349 (2005); Menachem Elon, Gerama and 
Garme, in 7 ENCYCLOPEADIA JUDAICA 502–03 (Fred Skolink & Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 
2007) (describing case). 
 149. See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text. 
 150. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).  
 151. Cf. Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. 
REV. 58, 72 (1973) (It would be inappropriate to apply one state‘s strict liability rule with another 
state‘s unlimited liability rule to produce a result that would not be reached had the law of either state 
been applied to both issues.). 
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The problem is similar to the phenomenon of dépeçage in conflict of 
laws, where the laws of different states govern different issues within a 
case such that the case may be decided in a way that no state would decide 
it if its law applied to all issues. Dépeçage can be justified when each 
state‘s interest is vindicated, provided that the same state‘s law is applied 
to issues that are linked.
152
 When an Israeli court uses a rule of Jewish law, 
Israel is the only interested state, and the court needs to be sure that the 
Jewish law rule does not distort Israel‘s policies.  
The court also has an obligation not to misconstrue the Jewish law rule, 
as will be discussed in the next part of this Article. 
B. Bootstrapping 
1. Escaping Water 
A court relying on Jewish law to fill a gap in Israeli law can be led into 
reading into Jewish law the very remedy that it seeks to find there. This 
happened in Amidar when the Court read a negligence requirement into 
the Jewish law of misrepresentation.
153
 It also happened in Mefi Co. v. 
Ashkenazi.
154
 The case involved a dispute between the owners of two 
nearby apple orchards. The plaintiffs sued for damage caused by water that 
escaped from the defendant‘s land. Under an applicable statute, the 
defendant would be liable unless it could show absence of negligence.
155
 
The majority of the Court held that the defendant was liable because it 
could not show lack of negligence even though it used a common method 
of irrigating its land.  
In his dissent, Justice Cohn thought that the defendant had met its 
obligation because it used its property in a common and normal manner. 
He relied on English cases such as Rylands v. Fletcher,
156
 and on what he 
thought was a similar rule in Jewish law. In Rylands, the House of Lords 
 
 
 152. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 97–104 (5th ed. 
2006); Reese, supra note 151. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46. 
 154. CA 302/67 Mefi Co. v. Ashkenazi [1968] IsrSC 23(1) 211, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra 
note 19, at 524.  
 155. Civil Wrongs Ordinance § 51 (Palestine). 
 156. (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). Among other 
authorities, Justice Cohn relied on Wilson v. Waddell, [1876] App. Cas. 95 (H.L.) (U.K.) (stating that 
by removing coal from his mine, the defendant caused water to percolate and flow into plaintiff‘s mine 
and that defendant had the right to use his property in the ―natural course of user‖); Smith v. Kenrick, 
(1849) 137 Eng. Rep. 205 (Q.B.) (U.K.) (There were two adjoining coal mines and water released by 
the defendant caused damage; the defendant was not liable for natural consequences as long as they 
were not the result of negligent or malicious conduct.). 
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imposed strict liability on the owners of a mill for damage to a nearby coal 
mine caused by flooding from a reservoir that was constructed on the 
defendant‘s property. Lord Cairns said that an owner would not be liable 
for using his property in the ―ordinary course,‖ but if an owner used his 
property in a ―non-natural‖ manner, then he did so at his peril.157  
Justice Cohn mistakenly thought that Jewish law made a similar 
distinction between normal and exceptional uses. As background he 
correctly stated the rule of Jewish law that if one indirectly causes damage 
to one‘s neighbor‘s land by some activity on one‘s land, one is not liable, 
though if one directly and immediately causes damage one would be 
liable.
158
 He showed that the rabbis applied this rule to exempt the owner 
of an upper story who poured water on a concrete floor where the water 
was first absorbed and later seeped down, damaging a lower story. If the 
water had poured down at once, however, the defendant would have been 
liable.
159
  
But then Justice Cohn wrote, ―[t]he foregoing applies when the use is 
normal and common but not when it is ‗exceptional,‘‖160 citing a 
responsum by the Rosh, Rabbenu Asher ben Yehiel (1250–1327), that 
involved a person‘s well that overflowed with rainwater, damaging 
another‘s cellar.161 The Rosh said that the well owner must remove the 
cause of the damage. The problem with Justice Cohn‘s reasoning is that 
the Rosh based his decision not on the defendant‘s use of the well being 
―exceptional‖ but on the damage being direct and immediate once the well 
overflowed.  
At first glance one might take issue with the Rosh and contend that the 
defendant‘s installation of the well was an indirect and remote cause of the 
plaintiff‘s damage. Indeed, the facts of the case before the Rosh seem 
similar to the situation where the owner of the upper story causes the 
concrete floor to gradually absorb water that leaks below. If so, the well 
owner ought not to have been liable. The Rosh‘s rationale, however, was 
more compelling. He gave what today would be called an economic 
analysis of the problem:  
In our case, when the rainwater falls it is collected in the well, and 
after awhile when it is full, the [waters] penetrate [the plaintiff‘s] 
 
 
 157. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 338–39.  
 158. Mefi, IsrSC 22(1) at 219, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 525. 
 159. Id., translated in 2 Rakover, supra note 19, at 524–25 (quoting CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws 
Concerning Neighbors 10:5–6). Maimonides‘s ruling was based on the Talmud. B. Bava Mezia 117a. 
 160. Mefi, IsrSC 22(1) at 219, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 525. 
 161. ROSH 108:10. 
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wall and flow into his cellar causing great loss. It is not at all similar 
to [the case of the upper storey owner.] In that case the upper storey 
owner cannot remove the source of the damage to another place 
because he cannot be without water. Moreover, the lower storey 
owner can easily fix the concrete ceiling so that the waters will not 
fall on him.
162
 
In modern terminology, the Rosh interpreted the rule in the upper story 
case as imposing the loss on the cheapest cost avoider.
163
 The implication 
is that the Rosh thought that in the case before him the defendant could 
have placed his well elsewhere at little cost whereas the homeowner would 
incur higher costs.
164
 If Justice Cohn had applied the Rosh‘s rationale to 
the case before him, he would probably have come to a different 
conclusion because it is likely that the defendant could have more 
efficiently prevented the damage than the plaintiff. 
2. Negligence 
Another instance of reading a common law doctrine into Jewish law 
occurred in Eliyahu Insurance Co. v. Yunan,
165
 which involved occupants 
of a car who were injured when rocks that were being blasted struck their 
vehicle. Justice Rubinstein delivered the opinion with two justices 
concurring. The Court held that the victims‘ sole remedy for their injuries 
was against those responsible for the explosion. Justice Rubinstein 
expressed his displeasure with the no-fault statute that makes vehicle 
drivers and owners responsible when injuries result from a traffic 
accident.
166
 The statute makes drivers and owners absolutely liable
167
 and 
prevents persons injured in traffic accidents from recovering in tort from 
 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 139 (1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089, 1118–19 (1972). 
 164. See RABBI YAAKOV LORBERBAUM (c. 1770–1832), NETIVOT HA-MISHPAT, Bi‟urim 155:3 
(commentary on the Shulhan Arukh stating that a defendant is required to remove the source of 
damage when the plaintiff‘s costs of preventing the damage are high); Ruth Sonshine, Jonathan Reiss, 
Daniel Pollack & Karen R. Cavanaugh, Liability For Environmental Damage: An American and 
Jewish Legal Perspective, 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 77, 109 (2000). 
 165. CA 10721/05 [2006] IsrSC Tak-El 2006(4) 1387. 
 166. Road Accident Victims Compensation Law (―Road Accident Law‖), 5735–1975, 29 LSI 311 
(1974–75) (Isr.). The statute has since been amended several times. For a discussion of the statute, see 
David Kretzmer, No-Fault Comes to Israel, 11 ISR. L. REV. 288 (1976). 
 167. Road Accident Law § 2(b). Owners are responsible only if the vehicle is used with their 
permission. Id. Liability is imposed ―whether or not there was fault on the part of the driver and 
whether or not there was fault or contributory fault on the part of others.‖ Road Accident Law § 2(c). 
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third parties for unintentionally caused injuries.
168
 Moreover, drivers 
cannot recover contribution from third parties.
169
 Justice Rubinstein held 
that the accident was not ―in consequence of the use of a motor vehicle,‖ 
as required by the statute,
170
 because the rocks could have injured anyone 
in the vicinity, and the accident‘s connection to the use of the vehicle for 
transportation was too remote.
171
 
Justice Rubinstein relied on Jewish law, saying that it established moral 
values that one must use greater care to avoid injury to others than to 
oneself, and that people who create obstacles on the public way are liable 
to those who are injured thereby—as the latter cannot be expected to look 
out for such obstacles.
172
 He said that Jewish law takes the approach that 
―liability [is owed] to those who are found on the roads who go about 
innocently, for their burden of care is small relative to those, the source of 
the injury, who have a higher burden of care.‖173 He thought the Knesset 
ought to permit, therefore, the victim to pursue the wrongdoer from a 
moral point of view.
174
  
What, however, is the ―burden of care‖ that Jewish law imposes on 
actors? Under Israeli law the blasters would not be liable unless they were 
negligent,
175
 and the question arises whether Jewish law recognizes that 
concept. Justice Rubinstein said that according to Professor Shalom 
Albeck, Jewish law takes the view that negligence (peshi„ah) is the basis 
of tort liability and that a person is liable when he ―engages in behavior 
that a person ought to foresee will cause injury if the matter is common 
and likely to happen . . . ; however, if the injury is so remote that people 
do not ordinarily foresee it, then it is indirect damage for which they are 
exempt.‖176 Justice Rubinstein thought that this reasoning justified holding 
the blasters liable.
177
 
 
 
 168. Road Accident Law § 8(a). 
 169. CA 3765/95 Hussein v. Torem [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 573. 
 170. Road Accident Law § 1 (defining ―road accident‖). 
 171. The statute applies to ―an occurrence in which bodily damage is caused to a person as a result 
of the use of a motor vehicle‖ whether the same is moving or stationary. Id. 
 172. Eliyahu, CA 10721/05 [2006] IsrSC Tak-El 2006(4) 1387, ¶ 9. The Tosafists in the twelfth 
through fourteenth centuries were the first to express the principle. Tosafot, B. Bava Kamma 23a, at 
the second ―U-Lehayyev Ba‗al Ha-gachelet‖; B. Bava Kamma 27b at ―‘Amai Patur ‘Iba‗ei Lei 
Le‗iyunei.‖ 
 173. Eliyahu, CA 10721/05 [2006] IsrSC, ¶ 9.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Tort Ordinance (New Version) § 38 (1968). That section shifts to the defendant the burden of 
showing a lack of negligence when damage is caused by a dangerous thing. Section 41 of the statute 
incorporates the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See Eliyahu, CA 10721/05 [2006] IsrSC ¶ 3(2). 
 176. Id. at 23 (quoting Shalom Albeck, PESHER DINE HA-NEZIKIN BA-TALMUD [GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORT IN THE TALMUD] 20, 44 (1965)). In rabbinic Hebrew the term 
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The opinion read a concept of negligence into Jewish law, defined in 
terms of foreseeability, which is not supported by the classical texts taken 
as a whole. As I have shown elsewhere,
178
 although Professor Albeck‘s 
theory explains some of the rules in Jewish tort law,
179
 it does not explain 
others. For example, the Talmud specifies different levels of compensation 
due, depending on whether the injury is caused directly by a person‘s 
activity or whether it is caused by his property or obstacles he created.
180
 
Compensation for medical expenses and pain are owed only if the injury is 
committed by a person‘s activity and only if the person acts either 
intentionally or with inadvertence bordering on intention.
181
 In some cases 
only half damages are due.
182
 A person is required to exercise greater care 
for an ox that has not previously caused damage than for an ox that has a 
known propensity for damage.
183
 In some situations there is no liability for 
foreseeble damage. For example, if a fire spreads to a neighbor‘s land, one 
is not liable for damage to objects that are not in the open.
184
 This also 
occurs in many situations where Jewish law imposes no liability for 
indirect damage.
185
 For example, if one hires people to give false 
 
 
peshi„ah refers to inadvertence that is close to intention. See Rashi, B. Bava Kamma 26b, at ―Le-‗Inyan 
Arba‗ah Devarim Patur.‖ Albeck uses it to mean negligence. See Shalom Albeck, Torts, in 20 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 63 (Fred Skolink & Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Steven F. Friedell, Liability Problems in Nezikin: A Reply to Professor Albeck, 15 DINÉ 
ISRAEL 97 (1989–90); Friedell, supra note 63. 
 179. E.g., B. Bava Kamma 52b (one who covers a pit left in the public way that camels 
occasionally use ought to foresee that they will be there and make the covering strong enough); Rashi, 
Bava Kamma 3b, at ―Diko-ah ‘Aher Mi‗urav Bah‖ (one ought to foresee that a normal wind will 
spread a fire). 
 180. For example, there is no liability if one places objects on a roof to dry them and they are 
blown off by an unusual wind and injure a person below. B. Bava Kamma 29a. If a person on top of 
the roof, however, is blown over by the unusual wind he would be liable for damage. B. Bava Kamma 
27a.  
 181. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 182. If an ox that gored another had not gored another animal or person in the past, the owner was 
liable for half damages. See Exodus 21:35. Some cases of unusual injury are derivatives of ―horn.‖ 
See, e.g., CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Damage by Chattels 1:8 (if an ox damaged by 
pushing, sitting, kicking, or biting). 
 183. B. Bava Kamma 45b; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 396:1. 
 184. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 418:13.  
 185. Supra note 67. Rabbi Shabbetai ben Meir Ha-Kohen (1621–1662) held that liability is 
imposed on indirect damages that are of common occurrence if they are the specific kinds of situations 
that were described in the Talmud. Shakh, SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 386:1, :24. Rabbi Yair 
Bachrach (1638–1702) gave a broader definition but one that still falls shy of imposing liability for 
foreseeable damages. He wrote that according to the Ritzvah, for one who imposes liability for indirect 
harms that commonly occur, it is not sufficient that the damages are common at the time of the 
defendant‘s act. The harms must be generally common. BACHRACH, supra note 148, at 45. That 
responsum dealt with a case where Shimon had a German court attach wine belonging to Reuben. A 
few days later the French army invaded and took the wine. Rabbi Bachrach gave several reasons for 
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testimony in a case where he is not a party, the Talmud says that one‘s tort 
liability is only in the court of Heaven.
186
 Similarly, one is only liable in a 
Heavenly court if one places poisonous food before an animal that kills the 
animal when eaten.
187
 If a person throws someone else‘s objects out a 
window and the defendant removes some cushions that would prevent 
them from breaking, some hold that the defendant is not liable for the 
damage because he did not directly cause it.
188
 One would have to stretch 
the concept of foreseeability beyond reasonable limits to bring these and 
similar rulings within the ambit of the negligence doctrine. In fact, Justice 
Silberg thought that the Jewish law of torts was based on the concept of 
absolute liability subject to a defense of absolute compulsion.
189
 Some 
sources of Jewish law suggest that in some circumstances the appropriate 
standard of care is that which is customary.
190
 Several sources suggest a 
defendant is liable for injuries caused directly by his actions if he behaved 
in an unusual manner unless the plaintiff behaved in a manner that was at 
least as unusual.
191
 These doctrines are not the same as the modern concept 
of negligence. 
Professor Albeck‘s approach tries to incorporate negligence concepts 
from Western legal systems into Jewish law. When Justice Rubinstein 
relies on this approach as a means of using Jewish law to support Israeli 
law, we have come full circle.  
 
 
exempting Shimon, including that disturbances of that kind are not generally a matter of common 
occurrence even though the loss of the wine was to be expected under the circumstances. 
 186. B. Bava Kamma 56a. The rule is codified in SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 32:2. 
 187. B. Bava Kamma 47b. 
 188. B. Bava Kamma 26b; see Rosh, supra note 67. Maimonides disagreed with the Rosh. CODE 
OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Damage by Chattels 7:7. The Shulhan Arukh contains conflicting 
views on this point. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 386:4. 
 189. CrimA 17/59 Maor-Mizrahi v. Attorney General [1960] IsrSC 14 1882, 1893–95, translated 
in 1 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 436–38. See also Irwin Haut, Some Aspects of Absolute Liability 
Under Jewish Law and Particularly Under the View of Maimonides, 15 DINÉ ISRAEL 7, 29–31 (1989–
90). The post-Talmudic authorities dispute whether the obligation for damage caused by one‘s 
property is due to a failure to guard it or by virtue of one‘s ownership of the object. See Sinai, supra 
note 1, at 572. 
 190. E.g., TOSEFTA, Bava Kamma 10:29 (if a worker or a poor person climbs a tree at a place 
where this is common, they are not liable for breaking a booth in the process); J. Bava Kamma 10:4 (if 
a worker or a poor person climbs a tree at a time when this is the practice, then they are exempt from 
breaking a booth in the process); Nahmanides, NOVELLEA, commentary to B. Bava Mezia 82b (―in 
torts [like those classified as ‗fire‘] we do not require a heightened standard of care as is true of a paid 
bailee; rather if he took the precautions that people take he is exempt from tort liability‖); Tosafot, B. 
Bava Kamma 23a, at ―Be-she-shimer Gachalto‖ (even though dogs can break down an ordinary door, 
one who takes precautions that people take against such break-ins is not liable). This is similar to, but 
not the same as, the modern concept of negligence. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 
1932) (―[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its 
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.‖). 
 191. See supra note 68. 
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It might be argued that the opinions in Mefi and Yunan were written 
with the hope of influencing rabbinic courts and rabbinic authorities to 
change the law. Jewish law, like any legal system, is not fixed. It develops 
applications of established doctrine and refines and replaces older ones. 
Although an Israeli court is within its rights to say that some parts of 
Jewish law doctrine do not fit the needs of modern society, it is important 
for their own institutional reasons that these courts not misstate a 
precedent‘s meaning.  
Moreover, Jewish law, like other legal systems, resists frequent, rapid, 
and radical change. Although rabbis have occasionally borrowed rules of 
law from surrounding legal systems,
192
 they have also been sensitive to 
displacing revered doctrines. As the Rashba, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham 
Adret, wrote about 700 years ago when asked to apply a non-Jewish law 
of inheritance instead of rabbinic law: 
This would uproot all of the laws of the perfect Torah. Why would 
we then need our holy books compiled by Rabbi [Judah the Prince, 
author of the Mishnah] and later by Ravina and Rav Ashi 
[compilers of the Babylonian Talmud]? They would teach their 
children the gentile‘s laws, and build patched altars in the gentile‘s 
study houses. Heaven forbid that a thing should not happen to 
Israel. Heaven forbid, lest the Torah wrap itself in sackcloth.
193
 
3. Good-faith Bargaining 
A better way to handle the need for change is to highlight the common 
goals that exist between Israeli and Jewish law and suggest that rabbinic 
authorities consider changing some aspects of Jewish law. Justice 
Englard‘s opinion in Kal Binyan v. A.R.M. Rananah Building & Leasing, 
Ltd.
194
 provides a good example. In that case the defendant solicited bids 
for a construction project from ten different companies. The plaintiff‘s bid 
was the lowest, and the two sides worked out all of the terms subject to 
formal approval by the defendant‘s board of directors. The board 
 
 
 192. See 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 63. It is also possible that non-Jewish law has 
influenced Jewish law indirectly when non-Jewish law has shaped widely shared expectations of the 
Jewish community. For an example involving medical malpractice, see Friedell, supra note 78. 
 193. Original translation by author of RABBI SOLOMON BEN ABRAHAM ADRET (c. 1235-c. 1310), 
RESPONSA RASHBA 6:254. The responsum is discussed in Nahum Rakover, Jewish Law and the 
Noahide Obligation to Preserve Social Order, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1073, 1120 (1991). 
 194. CA 6370/00 [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 289. 
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ultimately rejected the plaintiff‘s bid in favor of another contractor who 
had not participated in the bidding process.  
In an earlier proceeding, the Supreme Court determined that the 
defendant had not negotiated in good faith and returned the case to the 
district court to determine the amount of damages.
195
 An Israeli statute 
provides that a party that does not bargain in good faith is liable for 
―damages.‖196 The issue for the Supreme Court on the second appeal was 
whether the plaintiff could recover expectation damages in addition to 
reliance damages. The court unanimously held that under the 
circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to recover both types of damages. 
Two of the three judges wrote opinions. Justice Barak indicated that in 
most cases of bad faith negotiations, only reliance damages are allowed 
because the extent of the expectation damage is unknowable, regardless of 
whether a contract would have been formed.
197
 However, when the breach 
of the duty of good faith bargaining occurs at an advanced stage, the 
principle of returning the parties to the status before the breach requires 
allowing expectation damages.
198
  
Justice Barak referred to no sources of Jewish law, citing only 
secondary sources concerning Israeli and European contract law. By 
contrast Justice Englard‘s opinion derived almost entirely from Jewish law 
sources. Although he ultimately accepted Justice Barak‘s reading of the 
statute,
199
 Justice Englard‘s opinion considered whether Jewish law might 
be helpful if the issue before the court revealed a lacuna in the law within 
the meaning of the Foundations of Law Act of 1980.
200
  
Justice Englard‘s opinion provides an overview of the Jewish law of 
contracts. In Jewish law, words alone are insufficient to create a 
contract.
201
 Although there is a strong religious obligation to bargain and 
transact business in good faith, a party is not formally bound until there is 
a formal acquisition.
202
 If a buyer has paid for an item but has not yet 
performed the formal act of acquisition, then whichever side cancels the 
transaction is to receive a prescribed curse by the rabbinic court but suffers 
 
 
 195. CA 4850/96 Kal Binyan v. A.R.M. Rananah Bldg. & Leasing, Ltd. [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 562. 
 196. Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, 29 LSI 117, § 12 (Isr.). 
 197. Binyan, IsrSC 56(3) at 300–01. 
 198. Id. at 301. 
 199. Id. at 310. 
 200. See ELON TREATISE, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 201. Binyan, IsrSC 56(3) at 306. 
 202. Id. 
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no other penalty.
203
 The purpose of the curse is to encourage the defaulting 
party to change his mind.
204
  
In cases where no money has been paid, the religious sanctions for bad-
faith bargaining are less severe. Such a person might be deemed 
―untrustworthy and the sages are displeased with him.‖205 In some 
instances the disappointed party has the right to feel resentment, and even 
if not legally obligated, some parties might be encouraged to act out of 
piety.
206
  
Justice Englard recognized the dilemma of the secular court seeking to 
incorporate Jewish law. The secular court can neither render a rabbinic 
court decision, nor can it impose religious sanctions on a party.
207
 Justice 
Englard thought the court must decide whether to adopt the Jewish law‘s 
determination that the person bargaining in bad faith has committed a 
wrong, and then decide whether to impose liability for expectation 
damages as a substitute for religious sanctions. Similarly, he suggested 
that imposing such damages would develop Jewish law and might help 
rabbinic courts adopt the same rule either as matter of custom or by virtue 
of the rabbinic rule that the ―law of the kingdom is the law.‖208 
Justice Englard‘s opinion begins by looking to Jewish law to fill a gap 
in Israeli law and ends by suggesting how Israeli law might help change 
Jewish law. As mentioned, Justice Englard based his decision on Justice 
Barak‘s reading of the statute. However, one could read the opinion as a 
hint to rabbinic courts and rabbinic authorities to consider changing 
Jewish law so as to allow recovery of expectation damages. The opinion 
might even serve as an invitation to the religious leaders to engage in a 
process of mutual development of the law. It is not clear, however, that 
rabbinic leaders will adopt the suggested reform. As Justice Englard 
recognized, later rabbinic authorities disagree over whether a party 
bargaining in bad faith is obligated to pay even the other side‘s reliance 
costs.
209
 Further, some Jewish law sources recognized that in certain 
 
 
 203. Id.; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 204:1. The curse is as follows: ―He who punished 
the generation of the flood, [the people of the dispersion following the incident of the Tower of Babel], 
the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Egyptians who drowned in the sea, He will punish 
whoever does not keep his word.‖ 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 148; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen 
Mishpat 204:4. 
 204. ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 204:2. 
 205. 1 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 149–50. 
 206. Binyan, IsrSC 56(3) at 308. 
 207. Id. at 310. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 309. The opinion cites two responsa. The first, Moses Sofer (1762–1839), RESPONSA 
HATAM SOFER, Yoreh Deah 246, concerns a father who breached his oral agreement to hire a certain 
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circumstances, the innocent party has, to some extent, taken the risk that 
the other side would back out of the negotiations.
210
 Also, Jewish law‘s 
position on awarding compensation for lost profits is problematic.
211
 
Despite these difficulties, Justice Englard‘s opinion suggests a way for 
rabbinic courts and rabbinic authorities to change the law if they feel it 
warranted. 
IV. IS JEWISH LAW AN APPROPRIATE SOURCE OF PRECEDENT? 
There are many instances where Israeli judges have referred to Jewish 
law while avoiding the problems this Article has identified. Two examples 
arise in the bioethics field. In Belker v. State of Israel,
212
 the defendant was 
charged with murder after he threw his wife from the fourth floor of a 
building, causing her to become ―brain dead.‖213 The defendant contended 
that since his wife‘s heart and breathing continued as long as she was 
given artificial respiration, she was not dead. In the course of its decision, 
the Court reviewed the development of Jewish law over the centuries. It 
recognized that Jewish law originally defined death as the lack of 
respiration, that subsequent authorities saw respiration only as evidence of 
heart function, that others added a requirement of ―lying still as a stone,‖ 
and that among modern authorities there are some who accept the concept 
of brain death.
214
 The lesson drawn was that ―the tendency of the rulings 
was always to correlate the halakhic signs of death with the medical 
knowledge concerning the physiological processes of the human body in 
each era.‖215 
Another outstanding decision was Shefer v. State of Israel,
216
 which 
involved a mother‘s request for the right to deny respiration and 
intravenous medications other than painkillers to her young daughter who 
 
 
mohel to circumcise his son. After the mohel spent money in reliance, the father hired another. Rabbi 
Sofer suggested that even though the damages were indirect and so would not be collectible under the 
formal law, as a matter of piety the father ought to honor his agreement with the mohel especially in 
light of public humiliation that he caused the mohel. In the other responsum, RESPONSA MINHAT 
YITZHAK 4:104, Rabbi Isaac Jacob Weiss (1902–1989) discusses several earlier responsa, some 
imposing liability as direct damages, some exempting liability in a court of man but imposing liability 
in a court of Heaven, and some recognizing that there might be liability for a rabbinic fine. 
 210. RESPONSA MINHAT YITZHAK 4:104. 
 211. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 212. CrimA 341/82 [1986] IsrSC 41(1) 1, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 701. 
 213. Id., translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 701. 
 214. Id. at 31–39, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 707–10. 
 215. Id. at 34, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 708. 
 216. CA 506/88 [1993] IsrSC 48(1) 87, translated in [1992–1994] IsrLR 170, and in ELON 
CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 592, 638.  
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suffered from Tay-Sachs disease. In a lengthy opinion, Justice Elon 
reviewed the development of views within Judaism on the physician‘s 
duty to heal, the extent of a patient‘s right to refuse treatment, and 
distinctions between passive and active euthanasia. Justice Elon placed the 
earlier sources in their historical context and noted differences of opinion 
among modern rabbinic authorities concerning the proper application of 
older sources to problems faced by modern medicine.
217
 The rabbinic 
sources suggest goals that are sometimes in conflict: physicians have an 
obligation to save a patient‘s life even against the will of the patient, 
doctors may not take steps to prolong the life of a dying patient if there is 
no hope of a cure and the treatment would prolong the patient‘s suffering, 
and doctors may not shorten the life of a dying patient.
218
 Justice Elon 
drew upon this data when formulating a doctrine that synthesized the 
values of a Jewish and democratic state. In doing so, Justice Elon 
recognized that a synthesis of these values is not always possible. For 
example, the rule in Jewish law that a doctor must treat a dying patient 
against his will when such treatment will be beneficial cannot be 
reconciled with the view of Western democracies that a person can 
ordinarily refuse to receive medical care.  
Another case that makes good use of Jewish law is Ben Shahar v. 
Mahlev.
219
 In a dispute involving the sale of an apartment, the parties 
entered into a consent judgment providing that if the buyer failed to make 
certain payments he would need to vacate the apartment. The buyer 
became paralyzed and defaulted six months after entering into the consent 
judgment. When the buyer‘s son learned that the seller sought to have his 
father evicted, he deposited the amount due with the court and sought to 
reopen the judgment. Although the common law gives courts a narrow 
power to reopen consent judgments,
220
 the Israeli Supreme Court held that 
it has the inherent power to give relief to the tenant on equitable grounds. 
In the course of his opinion, Justice Cohn drew on several sources of 
Jewish law that demonstrate a rabbinic court‘s power to modify court 
orders when necessary in the interest of justice.
221
 Justice Cohn recognized 
 
 
 217. Id. at 134, translated in [1992–1994] IsrLR 170, 235, and in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 
45, at 649. 
 218. Id. at 139–43, translated in [1992–1994] IsrLR 170, 240–45, and in ELON CASEBOOK, supra 
note 45, at 651–53. 
 219. FH 22/73 [1974] IsrSC 28(2) 89, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 657. 
 220. The court quoted H. D. Warren, Annotation, Power to Open or Modify "Consent" Judgment, 
139 A.L.R. 421, 430 (1942), noting that some American courts made an exception in case of minors 
and persons under disability where there was a change of circumstances. Ben Shahar, IsrSC 28(2) at 
93. 
 221. Ben Shahar, IsrSC 28(2) at 99–100, translated in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 659–60. 
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that the rabbinic sources did not involve consent judgments. Nor did he 
suggest that Israeli courts adopt the same tools as those used in rabbinic 
courts. Rather, he took a broad view of the underlying policy of promoting 
justice that he found in the rabbinic sources.
 
 
In another case, Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs,
222
 the court 
decided that a woman could not be excluded from membership on a 
religious council because of her gender. The religious council‘s function 
was to maintain religious services and make them available to local 
residents. Justice Elon held that an Israeli statute prohibiting 
discrimination against women applied to the case. He wrote an extensive 
opinion showing a variety of viewpoints throughout Jewish history on the 
question of women‘s rights to govern, vote, and study Torah. Maimonides 
had ruled that women could not be appointed to any official position.
223
 In 
the twentieth century, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook expressed his opinion 
that women should neither vote nor serve in office.
224
 Other modern rabbis 
disagreed with these views based on history, morality, and political 
need.
225
 The opinion showed tension in Jewish law between a need to 
preserve continuity and a desire for creativity and development. 
In Rosenstein v. Solomon,
226
 the defendant used force to dispossess 
another of land that he claimed belonged to him. The trial court decided 
the merits in favor of the defendant. The issue before the Supreme Court 
was whether the defendant should have relinquished control of the land 
prior to bringing suit. The Israeli statute governing the matter is 
ambiguous. It provides: 
 
 
Justice Cohn discussed the rule that a person who deposited a document embodying his rights with a 
court and declared that if he did not return within thirty days the document would be void. He was 
unavoidably prevented from returning within thirty days. Although there was a difference of opinion in 
the Talmud, see B. Nedarim 27a, the law developed that in case of duress the stipulation is void. CODE 
OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction 7:10. 
Similarly, if a debtor paid part of the debt and deposits a bond for the entire debt with a third person, 
declaring that if he does not pay the remaining debt within a certain time that the bond should be 
delivered to the creditor, the law developed that the stipulation would be effective if made in the 
presence of a distinguished court. However, an exception was made if illness or ―a river‖ prevented the 
debtor from meeting his obligation. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning Sale 11:13 to :14. 
Finally, Justice Cohn drew support from the general power of a rabbinic court to declare property 
ownerless and to assign it to another. See CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and 
the Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction 24:6. 
 222. HCJ 153/87 [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 493. 
 223. CODE OF MAIMONDES, Laws Concerning Kings 1:5. 
 224. See Shakdiel, IsrSC 42(2) at 248–49, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 498–
99. 
 225. See id. at 251, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra 45, at 500–01. 
 226. CA 756/80 [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 113, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 178, 
and in 2 RAKOVER, supra note 19, at 533. 
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Whoever dispossesses the possessor of land otherwise than pursuant 
to Section 18(b) must return the land to the possessor. However, this 
provision does not detract from the authority of the court to 
adjudicate the rights of both parties at the same time, and the court 
may award possession as it deems just and under such conditions as 
it deems appropriate, pending the final decision on the merits.
227
  
Ottoman law, which had previously governed real estate matters in the 
State of Israel, required the party who dispossessed the other of the land to 
give up possession before proceeding to adjudication.
228
 Continental law 
also took this view.
229
 By contrast, English common law allows for self-
help.
230
 A member of the Knesset also referred to Jewish law as allowing 
self-help in legislative debates.
231
  
A majority of the Supreme Court panel held that the trial court acted 
within its discretion. Justice Kahan wrote that ―flagrant use of force‖ does 
not deprive the defendant of the right to self-help.
232
 Justice Elon 
dissented, observing that the plaintiffs had peacefully worked the land for 
a long period of time and that the defendants had forcefully seized the 
property from them.
233
 Although the issue of whether one may resort to 
self-help was disputed in the Talmud, Justice Elon stated, ―[t]he vast 
majority of halakhic authorities accept the view . . . that one may resort to 
self-help, even if he would not suffer any loss by bringing a lawsuit.‖234 
Justice Elon then noted that some medieval rabbis either disallowed self-
help entirely, limited it to cases of hot pursuit, limited it to situations 
where ―it is clear and known to all‖ that the property was stolen from the 
one resorting to self-help, or limited the means by which one could use it 
in reclaiming the stolen property.
235
  
Jewish law sources can support just about any imaginable solution, 
from allowing self-help, to disallowing it, to allowing it with conditions. 
Had Justice Elon merely relied upon the rabbinic precedents that 
 
 
 227. Land Law, 5729-1969§  (Isr.). Section 18(b) permitted self-help within thirty days of a 
dispossession. See Rosenstein, IsrSC 38(2) at 125, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 
178. 
 228. See Rosenstein, IsrSC 38(2) at 118, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 179. 
 229. Id., translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 179.  
 230. Id. at 118–19, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 179. 
 231. Id. at 127, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 181. 
 232. Id. at 140, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 187. 
 233. Id. at 136, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 186. 
 234. Id. at 129, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 183, and in 2 RAKOVER, supra 
note 45, at 534. 
 235. Id. at 129–32, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 183–84, and in 2 RAKOVER 
supra note 45, at 534–35. 
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disallowed or limited the right to self-help, he would have met one of the 
goals of Mishpat ‗Ivri by grounding his decision in Jewish law. A broader 
view would suggest that the principle underlying the disparate rules is that 
each court must decide for itself what is best suited to the circumstances 
and needs of the time. Justice Elon took an even broader view: ―Deciding 
the law for the sake of truth and peace, according to needs of the time, is a 
meta-principle.‖236 His opinion made effective use of Jewish law by 
seeking a broad principle to apply to the case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One conclusion to be drawn from this brief look at Israeli cases is that, 
while it is natural to attempt to resolve an issue based on a particular rule 
of Jewish law, one needs to be careful to evaluate that rule in its legal and 
historical context. The problem is more serious than the one faced by 
courts when they rely upon precedents of other jurisdictions. Jewish law 
precedents from another age will not necessarily be practical today or fit 
into the Israeli legal system. For example, the Talmud may regard the 
elements constituting acts such as ―robbery‖ or ―misrepresentation‖ 
differently than courts today.
237
 Even if a particular rule of Jewish law 
does fit, it might be used in ways that violate the spirit of Jewish law. For 
example, one should not expect Jewish law to endorse a violation of the 
Sabbath, as was done in the Horev.
238
 In some instances, the desire to use 
Jewish law is so strong that the court turns Mishpat ‗Ivri on its head, 
reading the desired rule back into Jewish law.
239
 
Although this Article has been critical of some decisions by the Israeli 
Supreme Court and has identified some problems with its use of Jewish 
law, Jewish law can serve a useful purpose in the Israeli legal system. 
Even when its rules do not fit the needs of the time, it is possible for a 
secular court to find an underlying principle that remains valid and useful. 
Courts must consider values inherent in their culture when they interpret 
 
 
 236. Id. at 134, translated in ELON CASEBOOK, supra note 45, at 186, and in 2 RAKOVER supra 
note 19, at 537 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Elon quoted a responsum by Jacob Reischer, an 
eighteenth century Polish halakhic authority, which addressed a dispute between partners over the 
division of a jointly owned basement. One of the partners demanded the part of the basement that 
adjoined his dwelling. Although there was older authority that in such circumstances the partner could 
claim that ―might makes right‖ and assert that ―[h]e who knows that truth is on his side may do 
everything to assert his right,‖ Rabbi Reischer decided that the partners should cast lots. RESPONSA 
SHEVUT YA‘AKOV, Hoshen Mishpat 2:167. 
 237. See supra Parts III.A.1 & 3. 
 238. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 239. Supra Part III.B.  
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precedents and statutes. Jewish law embodies many of the values of the 
Jewish people. Moreover, a judge should cite any source that makes the 
opinion more persuasive, be it Shakespeare,
240
 Lewis Carroll,
241
 T.S. 
Eliot,
242
 Yiddish sayings,
243
 or the Talmud.
244
 Just as judicial outlooks are 
shaped by a host of influences, including popular culture and literature, it 
is also natural for judges writing in Hebrew to use terms and expressions 
that originated in Jewish law, and to draw upon the extensive legal 
tradition that defined their meanings. 
When courts cite material from Jewish law, one can fairly question 
whether Jewish law influenced the decision, was cited merely to provide 
support for a decision reached on other grounds,
245
 or was cited to 
demonstrate to a partially skeptical audience that Jewish law can be 
relevant to modern problems. Even when its influence on the outcome is 
minimal, Jewish law can be a source of pride, can play a role in 
developing a sense of national identity, and can help ground a decision in 
a rich religious legal tradition.
246
 It is a tradition that is part of the national 
heritage of all Jews, be they religious or not. 
 
 
 240. E.g., Ben Shahar v. Mahlev, FH 22/73 [1974] IsrSC 28(2) 89, 95–96 (Berinson, J.) (quoting 
from The Merchant of Venice and explaining Portia‘s motive for her argument that a court must not 
depart from precedent). Cf. Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the religious animosity in The Merchant of Venice). 
 241. CA 6339/97 Rooker v. Solomon [1999] IsrSC 55(1) 199, 254 (M. Cheshin, J.) (Humpty 
Dumpty on the meaning of words). Cf. Montana Sports Shooting Ass‘n v. Montana, 185 P.3d 1003, 
1010 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (same). 
 242. Rooker, IsrSC 55(1) at 253 (―Words strain, Crack[.]‖). Cf. Trevino v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 876 F.2d 1154, 1155 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jolly, J., dissenting) (same). 
 243. CA 7325/95 Yedi‗ot Aharonot, Ltd. v. Krauss [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 1, 93 (M. Cheshin, J.)  
(―half the truth is a whole lie‖). Cf. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Lawsuit, Shmasuit, 103 YALE 
L.J. 463 (1993) (―Yiddish is quickly supplanting Latin as the spice in American legal argot.‖). 
 244. Cf. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 400 (1999) 
(discussing the Talmudic sages‘ beliefs about judges who take bribes); BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEWISH 
LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS (1976). 
 245. See M. Bass & D. Cheshin, Jewish Law in the Judgments of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Israel, in 1 JEWISH LAW ANNUAL 200, 212 (1978) (Jewish law used for ―decoration‖). 
 246. See Ben Shahar v. Mahlev, FH 22/73 [1974] IsrSC 28(2) 89, 98, translated in 2 RAKOVER, 
supra note 45, at 657; 4 ELON TREATISE, supra note 1, at 1939. 
 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/4
